Abstract
The paper provides a close reading of Plotinus' obscure chapter Ennead IV.6.2. I try to make clear, beyond the central thesis that sense-perception is an active power, how it contributes to the argument of the whole treatise, how its seemingly disconnected comments make up a coherent line of thought, and how it remains consistent with Plotinus' positions expressed elsewhere.
Ennead IV.6.2 is a notoriously unclear chapter in Plotinus' oeuvre. As Emilsson put it, “[t]he positive account of perception in Chapter 2 is so obscure at crucial points that it can scarcely be used as a key to the interpretation of other passages”.1 Accordingly, he does not make substantive use of it at all.2 The chapter is indeed obscure; it contains a textual difficulty (in line 6) and is surprising in many ways (which is true of the whole treatise IV.6 anyway). Yet, its main point seems clear: perception is an active power (δύναμις) of the soul rather than a passive potency to receive information (IV.6.2.2–3), which is applied to memory in the subsequent chapter (IV.6.3). However, even though this makes good sense for memory, it is not entirely clear how does it apply for perception.3 It is also unclear how it relates to direct and indirect realism of perception. While IV.6.1 is among the primary evidence for direct realism (being against impressions as objects of perception), IV.6.2.3–6 appeals to activities of the soul that one might take as the direct object of the soul's cognition (cf. section 2.2).4 Again, it is difficult to make sense of the seemingly unconnected considerations following the main point, so the unity of this short chapter is blurred. Finally, the details of these other considerations seem problematic for Plotinus' theory set out elsewhere, so it is a pity that Emilsson did not at least show the consistency of this account and Plotinus' other accounts of perception. Even though a detailed interpretation of the chapter (and the treatise) was recently published by Daniela Taormina,5 it is not satisfactory in all its details. Hence, I aim to give a reading of this obscure and neglected chapter, trying to fit it into the whole of IV.6 and, more generally, into Plotinus' account of sense perception. First, I summarise chapter IV.6.1 as the immediate context of chapter 2 to see how it follows upon the preceding chapter naturally. Then, I provide a close reading of IV.6.2 (in section 2), through which I try to clarify the details of Plotinus' points and to find unity in the reasoning. Finally, I connect the chapter (in section 3) with the larger context of perception in Plotinus. My interpretation, in particular, will show a close parallel between IV.6.2 and III.6.1–2 and indicate the consistency of Plotinus' power account here with his theory of perception set out elsewhere that involves impression in the sense organ without turning the account into indirect realism.
1 Perception is not an impression in the soul: IV.6.1
In IV.6.1, Plotinus argues against any impression theory of perception. I.e., he denies that impressions (τύποι) in the soul made by external perceptible objects contribute anything to an explanation of sense perception. Furthermore, he argues that postulating impressions in the perceiver leads to unacceptable consequences and inconsistencies. Thus, he concludes that in perceiving, we are not aware of impressions but the perceptible objects themselves, and so what is perceived must be external to the perceiver soul and be located at another place.
Plotinus achieves this conclusion by examining what seeing is like and proposes to extend the result to the other senses (1.11–14). Although this extension is not made explicitly in chapter 1, he appears to do it in 2.10–18. Regarding vision, Plotinus appeals to its phenomenology and its metaphysical ground. While the arguments from phenomenology (1.14–28) hold for vision only, the primary metaphysical consideration (1.28–32) can plausibly be applied to the other senses too. In any case, Plotinus appears to suggest already in chapter 1 that sense perception does not and cannot involve impressions. He focuses on impressions in the soul, yet what he says about the requirement of difference and local separation between the perceiver subject and the perceived object (1.37–40) makes his argument detrimental to any account that appeals to any impression in the perceiver. That is, he denies physical impressions in the soul,6 indeed any affection in the soul,7 and any impression in the perceiver subject, apparently including the subject's body and sense organs. As Emilsson has put it, “[the chapter] seems to portray vision in such a way that it is difficult to see how an affection could be incorporated into the view presented”.8 This last point raises a problem I cannot detail here: how can the polemics of IV.6.1 be consistent with what Plotinus says about impressions in the sense organ in his account of perception elsewhere (esp. III.6.1.1–14, 2.29–54; IV.3.3.21–25, 26.1–9, 25–34; IV.4.23; IV.5; cf. I.1.7). I return to this issue in section 3 briefly, pointing to some considerations relevant to IV.6.2.9 What is crucial is that Plotinus proceeds in chapter 2 from the results of chapter 1, namely a complete denial of the impression theory of perception.
2 Reading of IV.6.2
Εἰ οὖν μὴ οὕτως, τίς ὁ τρόπος; Ἢ λέγει περὶ ὧν οὐκ ἔχει;11 τοῦτο γὰρ δυνάμεως, οὐ παθεῖν τι, ἀλλὰ τὸ δυνηθῆναι καὶ ἐφ’ ᾧ τέτακται ἐργάσασθαι. Οὕτως γὰρ ἄν, οἶμαι, καὶ διακριθείη τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τὸ ὁρατὸν καὶ τὸ [5] ἀκουστόν, οὐκ εἰ τύποι ἄμφω, ἀλλ’ εἰ μὴ τύποι μηδὲ πείσεις, ἀλλ’ ἐνέργειαι περὶ ὃ ἔνεισι12 πεφύκασιν. Ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀπιστοῦντες, μὴ οὐ δύνηται, ἐὰν μὴ πληγῇ, τὸ αὑτῆς γινώσκειν δύναμις ἑκάστη, πάσχειν, ἀλλ’ οὐ γινώσκειν τὸ ἐγγὺς ποιοῦμεν, οὗ κρατεῖν δέδοται, ἀλλ’ οὐ κρατεῖσθαι. [10] Τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ ἀκοῆς δεῖ νομίζειν γίνεσθαι· τὸν μὲν τύπον εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἀέρι πληγήν τινα οὖσαν διηρθρωμένην, οἷον γραμμάτων ἐγγεγραμμένων ὑπὸ τοῦ τὴν φωνὴν πεποιηκότος, τὴν μέντοι δύναμιν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσίαν οἷον ἀναγνῶναι τοὺς τύπους ἐν τῷ ἀέρι [15] γεγραμμένους ἐλθόντας πλησίον, εἰς ὃ ἐλθόντες πεφύκασιν ὁρᾶσθαι. Γεύσεως δὲ καὶ ὀσφρήσεως τὰ μὲν πάθη, τὰ δ’ ὅσα αἰσθήσεις αὐτῶν καὶ κρίσεις, τῶν παθῶν εἰσι γνώσεις ἄλλαι τῶν παθῶν οὖσαι. Τῶν δὲ νοητῶν ἡ γνῶσις ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀτύπωτός ἐστι μᾶλλον· ἀνάπαλιν γὰρ [20] ἔσωθεν οἷον προπίπτει, τὰ δὲ ἔξωθεν θεωρεῖται· καὶ ἔστιν ἐκεῖνα μᾶλλον ἐνέργειαι καὶ κυριώτεραι· αὑτῆς γάρ, καὶ ἔστιν αὐτὴ ἐνεργοῦσα ἕκαστον. Πότερα δὲ αὑτὴν μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ δύο καὶ ὡς ἕτερον ὁρᾷ, νοῦν13 δὲ ἓν καὶ ἄμφω τὰ δύο ἕν, ἐν ἄλλοις.
If, then, it is not like this, how does it work? Or does the soul speak about things that it does not possess? For this is a characteristic of power, not of being affected by something, but rather of being capable of and doing the work to which it has been assigned. For it is in this way, I think, that what is seen and what is heard would be distinguished too by the soul; [5] this would not be the case if either of them were impressions, but if it were their nature neither to be impressions nor affections, but rather activities concerned with that relative to which they are in the soul. But we, in our incredulity that each power would be able to cognise its object unless it is struck, bring it about that it is affected by, rather than cognises, what is near it, though it has been appointed to be in control of this, not to be controlled by it. [10] One should suppose that the process is the same in the case of hearing, too; the impression is in the air as a sort of articulated stroke, like letters inscribed by the maker of the sound, while the power and the substance of the soul does something like reading the impressions inscribed on the air [15] when they come near and reach the point at which they can naturally be seen. And in the case of taste and smell, there are, on the one hand, affections, and on the other, all that are perceptions of them and judgements are cognitions of the affections distinct from the affections themselves. But the cognition of intelligibles is rather unaffected and impressionless; for in a reverse manner, [20] the intelligibles, in a way, issue forth from within, while the sense-objects are viewed as external. And the former are activities in a stronger and more proper sense; for the cognition of intelligibles is of itself, and it is itself the activator of each of its objects. But we have discussed elsewhere whether the soul sees itself as two and as another, but sees intellect as one, and sees both of the two aspects as one.
2.1 Lines 2.1–3
First, Plotinus proceeds from the results of the previous chapter, that is, from the denial of impression theories of perception. If perception is not (and does not involve) an impression, how does it work? After a problematic clause (Ἢ λέγει…ἔχει), Plotinus continues with the exposition of his view: perception is a power (δύναμις), i.e., “being capable of and doing the work to which it has been assigned”. While this is the clearest point in the chapter, its import is not straightforward, so I return to it in section 3. At the moment, it is enough to note that perception is an active power of the soul to do something rather than to be affected in a certain way or receive something.
Τὰς αἰσθήσεις οὐ πάθη λέγοντες εἶναι, ἐνεργείας δὲ περὶ παθήματα καὶ κρίσεις, τῶν μὲν παθῶν περὶ ἄλλο γινομένων, οἷον τὸ σῶμα φέρε τὸ τοιόνδε, τῆς δὲ κρίσεως περὶ τὴν ψυχήν, οὐ τῆς κρίσεως πάθους οὔσης – ἔδει [5] γὰρ αὖ ἄλλην κρίσιν γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐπαναβαίνειν ἀεὶ εἰς ἄπειρον – εἴχομεν οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀπορίαν, εἰ ἡ κρίσις ᾗ κρίσις οὐδὲν ἔχει τοῦ κρινομένου. Ἤ, εἰ τύπον ἔχοι, πέπονθεν. Ἦν δ’ ὅμως λέγειν καὶ περὶ τῶν καλουμένων τυπώσεων, ὡς ὁ τρόπος ὅλως ἕτερος ἢ ὡς [10] ὑπείληπται, ὁποῖος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν νοήσεων ἐνεργειῶν καὶ τούτων οὐσῶν γινώσκειν ἄνευ τοῦ παθεῖν τι δυναμένων·
We say that sense perceptions are not affections but activities and judgements concerned with states resulting from affections; affections belong to something else, say, for instance, to the body qualified in a certain way, but the judgement belongs to the soul, since the judgement is not an affection – for if it was, [5] there would have to be yet another judgement, and we should have to go back for ever to infinity. None the less we had the further problem, whether judgement insofar as it is a judgement possesses nothing of what is judged. In fact, if it has an impression [of it], then it has been affected. But it is still possible to say regarding what are called impressions that their character is quite different from [10] what has been supposed, and it is like that which is also found in instances of thinking which are also activities which are able to know without being affected in any way. (III.6.1.1–11)15
Plotinus indicates that an aporia would arise if perception is an activity (ἐνέργεια) or judgement (κρίσις) of the soul since a subject can make a judgement about X only if it possesses X.16 But if the soul possessed X as an impression, it would be affected (which Plotinus wants to rule out). So it seems that either the soul can judge X by possessing X, and so has impressions and is affected, or it is not affected, hence does not possess X, but then it cannot make judgements about X.17 I will call this the “Possession Aporia”. Plotinus only indicates his way out of the aporia here, which he details later (III.6.2.29–54, to this, I return in section 2.2.3). He discusses the option that the soul possesses what it judges but construes the soul's possession of it on a different model: similar to what happens in thinking (ἐπὶ τῶν νοήσεων), which is also an activity (ἐνεργειῶν) capable of knowing without being affected (γινώσκειν ἄνευ τοῦ παθεῖν τι δυναμένων). Thus, Plotinus' solution is to deny that possessing X implies having an impression of X that counts as affection. Instead, what is possessed is an “impression” metaphorically.18
So, three points are clear: (1) the aporia in III.6.1.6–7 arises from denying that the soul has impressions; (2) the formulation of the aporia turns on possessing (ἔχει) the item of which a judgement is made; and (3) the solution involves activity in the soul which is made possible by the power for specific knowledge. Comparing this to the beginning of IV.6.2, the parallel is striking. First, (1) as we have seen (and it is uncontested that), Plotinus proceeds from denying the impression theory of perception. Then comes our sentence (Ἢ λέγει… ἔχει), followed by Plotinus' own account of what perception is. This (3) involves a power (δυνάμεως, δυνηθῆναι), of which affection is denied (οὐ τὸ παθεῖν τι) – compare ἄνευ τοῦ παθεῖν τι δυναμένων at III.6.1.11 – and activity is assigned to it instead (ἀλλὰ τὸ δυνηθῆναι καὶ ἐφ’ ᾧ τέτακται ἐργάσασθαι). Then, later in the chapter, Plotinus specifies this activity as knowing or cognising (γινώσκειν in line IV.6.2.8, γνῶσις in lines 2.18, 19), just as in III.6.1.11. So the account in IV.6.2 matches the one in III.6.1. Hence, it is not surprising that (2) our sentence matches the statement of the aporia: compare Ἢ λέγει περὶ ὧν οὐκ ἔχει in IV.6.2.1 with εἰ ἡ κρίσις ᾗ κρίσις οὐδὲν ἔχει τοῦ κρινομένου in III.6.1.7, where λέγει and κρίσις can be equated.
Thus, I suggest an alternative interpretation that connects the remark in IV.6.2.1–2 to the parallel aporia in III.6.1.6–14. However, to have an allusion, the sentence (Ἢ λέγει… ἔχει) is best understood as a question rather than a restatement. This understanding also removes the inconsistency that would follow from taking the Possession Aporia seriously.19 Moreover, in this interpretation, Plotinus' power account is well-motivated, being a response to a significant aporia,20 unlike in the “restatement interpretation”. More advantages of my reading will become clear as we further analyse IV.6.2, esp. lines 3–6.
2.2 Lines 2.3–6
Thus, once Plotinus set out his aim to provide an alternative account of perception to the impression theory (2.1), indicated an aporia for such an account (2.1–2), and provided the core of his theory (2.2–3), he offers a reason for adopting his view (2.3–6). It is clear that he considers it as a reason (note ‘for’ γὰρ) – indeed an additional one (note ‘too’, the καὶ before διακριθείη) – even if tentatively (note ‘I think’ οἶμαι). The claim is, however, not very clear. He cryptically points to an additional psychic phenomenon (διακρίσις besides κρίσις). The idea is that the soul would be able to distinguish what is seen and what is heard (διακριθείη τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τὸ ὁρατὸν καὶ τὸ ἀκουστόν) only if perception involves activities rather than passive impressions or affections. There are two difficulties in understanding this point: (1) the uncertainty of what the psychic phenomenon is; and (2) a textual issue in line 6 regarding (i) ἔνεισι (of the manuscripts) or ἔπεισι (Sleeman's conjecture, see n. 12), which relates to (ii) the grammar and sense of περὶ ὃ (line 6), and also to (iii) the reference of ‘either of them’ ἄμφω.
2.2.1
Consider the question of the phenomenon first. Three points seem clear: it refers to making a distinction or decision (διακρίνειν, for physical stuff, it means ‘separation’), which the soul does21 as an additional act to judging perceptible things. It is not apparent, however, what is the object of distinguishing: it might be either (a) what is seen (τὸ ὁρατὸν) and what is heard (τὸ ἀκουστόν) separately in two acts of διακρίσις;22 or (b) what is seen and what is heard in a single διακρίσις.23 While the phrasing might indicate that (a) there are two acts (the parallel: “καὶ… καὶ…”), I suggest taking it as (b) a single act distinguishing the two objects. There are two main reasons for this. First, making a distinction (or separation) involves multiple items distinguished from one another. If there were (a) one διακρίσις of what is seen and another one of what is heard, it would be unclear from what these objects are distinguished. One might say that what is seen is distinguished from some background in the visual field or some other object in the vicinity. But then, second, this διακρίσις would be nothing but the perceptual judgement itself that constitutes seeing in the first place instead of being an additional act of the perceptual soul. Then, however, it would be curious to refer to it as διακρίσις rather than ordinary κρίσις, as Plotinus typically calls it.24 Thus, we have good reasons for taking διακρίσις as (b) an act of the soul – additional to the κρίσεις of seeing and hearing – in which what is seen is distinguished from what is heard.
If this interpretation is correct, we might go further to identify what such an act of distinguishing amounts to. “What is seen” and “what is heard” clearly refer to objects of two different sense modalities: sight and hearing. Objects of perception might be qualities or forms (εἴδη) (colour or sound) or bodies so qualified (coloured bodies or bodies making sound).25 Whether the objects are qualities only or the bodies possessing them, seeing will involve colours and hearing sounds in one way or another. So, again, if a perceiver is supposed to be seeing something and hearing something simultaneously, it makes sense to ask how she can distinguish between what she is seeing and hearing, between a colour and a sound.
This question, moreover, does not only make sense but had been asked before Plotinus by prominent philosophers (the work of whom Plotinus knew well and used): Pl. Tht. 184–186; Arist. de An. III.2, 426b8–427a15, Sens. 7; and Alex. Aphr. de An. 61.19–65.2; in Sens. 136.7–168.10; Quaest. III.9. Without going into the details of this problem, let me provide a few comments.26 First, the problem has two aspects: (I) How is it possible to simultaneously perceive two (or more) perceptible objects (like white and sweet, or even white and black) in a single and unified perceptual experience? (II) How is it possible to distinguish two perceptible features perceived simultaneously in two different sense modalities (white and sweet again)? Formulated thus, it is plausible that Plotinus considers the latter question27 (‘cross-modal distinction’),28 which depends on the former one: distinguishing two objects presupposes that the two objects are perceived simultaneously.29 Let me sketch (I) the former problem of simultaneous perception and then elaborate on (II) the problem referred to by Plotinus and how he seems to solve it.
(I) The problem of simultaneous perception is generated by the restricted scope of each sense modality. Since a given sense can only perceive objects specific to it – like colour for sight or sound for hearing – it cannot perceive (on its own) objects of other senses. However, our experience is single and unitary, simultaneously containing visual and auditory information. So, there must be a subject of this unitary experience which is different from the special senses and capable of perceiving all kinds of perceptible objects.30 This subject is the soul for Plato (Tht. 185D–E), a sense capacity for Aristotelians, probably (although it is not explicit) a unity formed from the senses while maintaining diversity for Aristotle, and the common sense or power of sense-perception for Alexander (de An. 63.6–28).
Moreover, if several objects or qualities are perceived simultaneously, the single subject must be capable of perceiving them together. And since perceiving an object involves receiving information about it, which is grounded in some physical process in the sense organs, the organs must be organised to make simultaneous affections of them possible. This is most lucidly discussed by Alexander (de An. 64.4–65.1; Quaest. III.9, 97.22–98.15). According to him, perceptible objects first affect the peripheral sense organs, but this affection is insufficient for perceiving. Therefore, the affection must be transmitted (through some channels) to the central organ in the heart,31 where the common sense resides. The transmission process brings about a physical change in a part of the central organ that corresponds to the affection in the peripheral organ. After the transmission, the sense power can cognitively grasp and be aware of the external object that initiated the process (by reading off the information from the affection in the central organ, as it were). Now, simultaneous perception occurs when multiple affections are transmitted to the central sense organ at the same time, and the sense power makes a single act of joint judgement of all these simultaneous affections. The sense power is capable of this complex judgement because it is an incorporeal capacity present as a whole in the organ.32 Unity on the level of soul-power, multiplicity on the level of bodily parts.
(II) Turning to cross-modal distinction, it is undoubtedly a subsequent task of the same subject that perceives the qualities simultaneously. Indeed, the affections related to different sense modalities are transmitted to the central organ from various peripheral organs through different channels. Thus, Alexander can explain cross-modal distinction by the distinction between the transmission sources (de An. 63.13–64.4). For example, if the transmission happens through the passages from the eyes, it is vision, and so the information transmitted is visual, and the quality grasped is a colour.
Notably, Alexander identifies the transmission of the perceptual affection in the above account as an ‘activity’ at some point (see Quaest. III.9, 97.8–19; de An. 63.12–64.3; and in Sens. 165.7–11, where he specifies that the capacity and so the perceptions are “divided by the activities in respect of the sense organs” ὑπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὰ αἰσθητήρια ἐνεργειῶν διαιρεῖται).33 Then, he can state that by means of the activity, the sense power can determine to which sense modality the given affection and so the given sensible feature belongs. Again, the perceptual grasp (ἀντίληψις) or judgement (κρίσις) is also an activity of the sense power.34 Thus, given that a visual cognition or judgement differs from an auditory one, the sense power can presumably determine which sense modality is in operation and which one relates to which perceived quality of the object. That is to say, Alexander's account offers the conceptual framework to explain cross-modal distinction both in quasi-physiological terms (transmission) – which is Alexander's account – and in psychological ones (grasp or judgement). While the quasi-physiological version depends on a hylomorphic view of the soul (where the soul activity is a bodily affection at once), the psychological one does not. Thus, I suggest that Plotinus' account is inevitably the essentially psychological one.35
Plotinus stresses, in our passage, that distinguishing the visible and the audible is only possible by having activities (ἐνέργειαι) and impossible with impressions or affections. The soul presumably can distinguish the activities, as they are the soul's own, so perhaps the soul has self-consciousness about what she is doing.36 This, however, should not count as strict self-knowledge, especially not of sense perception, which is ruled out in V.3.1–2. Yet, to understand what it amounts to, we should be able to determine which part of the soul Plotinus assigns the responsibility for cross-modal distinction. If sense perception itself (as for the Peripatetics), perception would involve reflexivity. But, if some higher cognitive power, like discursive thinking (διάνοια or λογισμός, cf. VI.4.6.13–19), the self-consciousness in question would be a higher-order act.37 But, again, while we can suppose the soul's capacity to be conscious of its own activities, this does not mean that it is always aware of all its activities. On the contrary, such an awareness seems to require attention (V.1.12.1–14; I.4.10).38 Be that as it may, Plotinus' silence in IV.6.2 does not allow us to decide on these issues. But, contrary to the awareness of activities, the soul could not distinguish the sense modalities by having impressions.39 Taormina suggests that the soul can make the distinction because the different perceptibles are present to it as actualised forms.40 While this seems correct, some of the details of her interpretation are unwarranted. In particular, she considers this διακρίσις quite complex, involving the coordination of perceptible forms of different senses, and attributes it to the rational soul while taking κρίσις as the mere activation of the forms without being propositional. Let us consider the textual difficulties in these lines to see how Plotinus' account should be understood.
2.2.2
Οὕτως γὰρ ἄν, οἶμαι, καὶ διακριθείη τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τὸ ὁρατὸν καὶ τὸ ἀκουστόν, οὐκ εἰ τύποι ἄμφω, ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ τύποι μηδὲ πείσεις, ἀλλ' ἐνέργειαι περὶ ὃ ἔνεισι πεφύκασιν. (IV.6.2.3–6)
Plotinus specifies the activities as περὶ ὃ ἔνεισι πεφύκασιν. Sleeman showed this is problematic because ἔνεισι (‘are present in’) would require a dative, like περὶ ἐκεῖνο ᾧ (meaning the ‘acts of that in which the objects become known’), but περὶ ὃ cannot be the contraction of it. Hence, he proposed ἔπεισι instead, meaning ‘acts in regard to what comes to the mind’.42 This reading would require περὶ ὃ to be understood as a contraction of περὶ τοῦτο ὃ, as indicated by subsequent editions, including the editio minor.43 The alternative of Harder (τούτου) περὶ ὃ ἔνεισι (and ὃ as acc.) – proposed to avoid the sense that the visible and audible (ἄμφω), viz. colour and sound, are activities concerning that which comes to the soul (ἐνέργειαι περὶ ὃ ἔπεισι), viz. colour and sound – is grammatically problematic.44 Then, with Sleeman's text, depending on the construal of ὃ (nom. or acc.), the meaning of the phrase would be either (A) ‘activities concerned with that which approaches [the soul]’, with ὃ as nom.;45 or (B) ‘activities concerned with that which [the soul] approaches’, with ὃ as acc.46 Admittedly, both of these readings are possible and have their own strengths. However, I aim to provide an alternative interpretation based on (C) Taormina's construal that retains the manuscript reading.47 I argue that my alternative (D) surpasses these in maintaining the manuscript reading and regarding the passage's sense and integration into the chapter.
Interpretation (A) links this claim to what Plotinus says about hearing: “the soul does something like reading the impressions inscribed on the air when they […] reach the point at which they can naturally be seen” (2.13–16). The wording is almost the same: compare ὃ ἔπεισι πεφύκασιν (2.6) with εἰς ὃ ἐλθόντες πεφύκασιν (2.15–16). While this is a strong connection to what follows, there are problems with this interpretation. Most importantly, besides changing the text, it supposes an implicit complement to the verb ἔπεισι: the soul (τῇ ψυχῇ). Again, what is said to approach the soul is an impression in the air (2.13–16), and the activity concerning this impression is hearing itself (τὸ ἀκούειν) rather than what is heard (τὸ ἀκουστόν). But in 2.3–6, it is τὸ ἀκουστόν that Plotinus appears to identify as an activity. For it is ‘either of them’, ἄμφω, that corresponds to ‘activities’ (ἐνέργειαι) in the text, and naturally, ἄμφω picks out τὸ ὁρατὸν καὶ τὸ ἀκουστόν in the preceding clause. To remedy the situation, Henry and Schwyzer take ἄμφω as picking out ‘seeing and hearing’ τὸ ὁρᾶν καὶ τὸ ἀκούειν instead.48 This would, indeed, make good sense, for Plotinus dismissed the identification of perceiving (seeing or hearing) with the impression (or affection) in chapter IV.6.1.49 According to this interpretation, he would recite this point here (2.5–6). While making good sense, this interpretation seems to impose too much onto the text: (i) correcting ἔνεισι to ἔπεισι; (ii) supplying τῇ ψυχῇ for ἔπεισι; (iii) requiring that the reference of ἄμφω is not what the context suggests, but something absent from the context. Moreover, (iv) while these lines would be connected to a passage below (2.13–16), they do not fit well with the immediately following (2.6–9). As we will see in section 2.3, Plotinus introduces a new point there, the causal relevance of the object of perception, which would not be new according to this interpretation (since in approaching the soul, the object is presumably active). Again, (v) whereas it is perhaps Plotinus' view that the sound approaches the perceiver in hearing (as in 2.13–16), he definitely denies this for vision in IV.5.1–4. So, it would create tension if he said here that in seeing as well, we perceive what approaches us.
Interpretation (B) emphasises the activity of the soul in turning towards (approaching) something (cf. III.6.2.36: προσῆλθε πρὸς ὃ ἔχει τὴν οὐσίαν). In Morel's proposal, the soul turns to the reason principles (λόγοι) that come from the intelligible and organise the bodies.50 While λόγοι are important in Plotinus' account of perception as determinants of what is perceived,51 this seems absent in the context. Lautner's alternative (suggested to me in personal communication) is more promising. He appeals to the interesting point of the soul's turning to one object (ὃ ἔπεισι [ἡ ψυχή]) of which it has visual and auditory perception at the same time, i.e., two types of perceptive activities towards the same object (ἐνέργειαι περὶ τοῦτο). Accordingly, the soul can distinguish the visual features of the object from its auditory features (τὸ ὁρατὸν καὶ τὸ ἀκουστόν) by distinguishing the visual and the auditory perceptual acts (τὸ ὁρᾶν καὶ τὸ ἀκούειν). Indeed, this seems to be Plotinus' account of the phenomenon (as I suggested in section 2.2.1 above). Moreover, this reading would establish a smooth connection to the following point in 2.6–9, where Plotinus infers that his account of cross-modal distinction (2.3–6) will not imply affection and that the soul is ruled rather than ruling, just as to the comparison of hearing to reading affections in the air (2.13–16) where the soul has to look out. Thus, the emphasis on the activeness of the soul is quite relevant: the soul initiates the epistemic process by approaching the object rather than the object by causing an impression.
Notwithstanding, the same textual difficulties hold as for the previous construal (A). First, (i) the correction to ἔπεισι; second, (ii) supplying an unstated term ‘the soul’ ἡ ψυχή as the subject of ἔπεισι (although this is perhaps acceptable, considering that ‘the soul’ appears as the only logical subject in singular in the sentence: διακριθείη τῇ ψυχῇ); finally, (iii) taking the activities to be seeing and hearing. Moreover, (vi) while the soul's activity of turning towards an object would render it pre-eminently active, mentioning the turning in connection to cross-modal distinction is somewhat unmotivated. For one, Plotinus only needs to establish that the visual and auditory processes are (distinct) activities (of the soul) so that they are distinguishable. Besides being aware of the visual and auditory processes, turning towards the visible and audible objects seems redundant.52 Notably, in IV.7.6.3–11, where Plotinus discusses the same issues (see section 2.2.1), he does not mention the soul's turning towards the single body that the soul perceives as having several qualities. Instead, he stresses that the qualities must come to the same item, the soul (τὰ εἰσιόντα; εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ [scil. the soul]). If the soul's turning towards the object is relevant, on the contrary, then Plotinus' phenomenon would be restricted to distinguishing qualities in different modalities of a single body, for which turning to that body seems quite relevant. While this is a salient case (‘cross-modal binding’),53 the phenomenon might be more general. It might include a case like seeing a person's face and hearing another person's voice and perhaps wondering if the person speaking is the one being seen: i.e., when the visual and auditory qualities (possibly or actually) belong to different bodies. My point is that cross-modal distinction is made the same way in such cases as when we focus on a single body.54
Taormina has proposed an alternative interpretation (C), which (i) keeps the received text, that is, ἔνεισι, (ii) without the need to supply implicit terms, understanding περὶ ὃ as elliptic for περὶ τοῦτο, περὶ ὃ, and (iii) on the face of it having the straightforward reference for ἄμφω as τὸ ὁρατὸν καὶ τὸ ἀκουστόν. According to this interpretation,55 Plotinus claims that what is seen and what is heard are not impressions nor affections but activities. Each of these activities is concerned with that thing (περὶ τοῦτο) in relation to which (περὶ ὃ) it is present inside (ἔνεισι). Importantly, Taormina points to the absolute use of the verb ἔνειμι by Plotinus in similar contexts in the sense that a process or activity is ‘present in [the soul]’, esp. III.6.2.24–25, 3.1–3, 8.3–5; also IV.7.85.21–22; V.3.6.38. The point of the passage would be, then, that seeing (and mutatis mutandis hearing) happens this way: the external colour (the object) induces an activity in the soul (= τὸ ὁρατὸν) which concerns the external colour and is present in the soul in relation to the external colour. Taormina establishes the coherence of the passage by suggesting that the idea that what is seen is an activity reoccurs later in 2.18–22, where the objects of perception generally are identified as activities. Thus, in her view, 2.3–6 concerns, in part, what happens in perceiving a single perceptible feature like colour and especially the ontological status of the perceptible object. Therefore, Taormina suggests Plotinus points to the account that in perceiving something external X, X becomes internalised within the soul as an activity, with the incorporeal presence of the perceptible form in the soul. Taormina connects this account to III.6.1.7–11 and takes as applying Aristotle's doctrine that in perception, the activity of the perceiver and that of the object perceived are one although different in being (Arist. de An. III.2, 425b26–27, 426a15–17).
Taormina suggests, in addition, that the activities are actualisations of perceptible forms in the soul, using which the soul is able to unify different modalities of perception and distinguish the different kinds of objects.56 More specifically, she takes κρίσις, as described in 2.16–18, to be less than perceptual judgement, an enouncement of a single term by a particular sense (or activation of a form), which the rational soul uses to make judgements about the sensible world. These judgements include perceptual judgements within a single sense modality (“This is white”) and the διακρίσις of cross-modal distinction. She takes the latter as possible because the forms in the soul are already intelligible.
While this interpretation is preferable on textual grounds and gives a good sense, I find four problems with it: first, (vii) regarding the connection to III.6; second, (viii) with the relationship to 2.1–2; third, (iii) after all ἄμφω would refer to seeing and hearing; fourth, (ix) in the explanation of διακρίσις.
Least important is that (vii) Taormina connects 2.3–6 to III.6.1.7–11. I grant that both passages identify the contents of perception as activities in the soul and as affectionless. However, III.6.1.7–11 is closer to IV.6.2.2–3 – where it is evoked as we have seen – than to 2.3–6. III.6.1.7–11 only indicates the germ of a solution implying the internal presence of activities, whereas 2.3–6, in Taormina's interpretation, is reminiscent of the more detailed account of III.6.2.32–54. Plotinus specifies in this passage that the activation of the soul power does not involve affection, which belongs to the sense organ. Taormina also refers to the idea that in perceptual activity, the form of the perceptible object comes to activity within the soul. This account builds upon the Aristotelian doctrine of the identity of the activity of the active and the passive powers taking place in the affected party.57 Thus, in Taormina's interpretation, 2.3–6 would allude to the more elaborate account of III.6.2. This seems possible; however, it must be stressed that the allusion is very dim, and, as I will argue below, it relates closer to Alexander's idea of transmission.
Again, (viii) if the point here is what Taormina identifies, that the object of perception is an activity internal to the soul, it becomes incomprehensible how this activity would be something that the soul does not possess, as it is implied by taking 2.1–2 (with Taormina) as a restatement.58 On the contrary, if 2.1–2 alludes to the Possession Aporia (as a question, my understanding), the point that the object is internal would be quite relevant as a solution to the aporia.
Yet, (iii) at the end Taormina seems to tacitly identify the internal activity not with the object perceived – which should be the external body and its perceptible forms – but with the perceptive activities seeing and hearing: “le visible et l’audible, extérieurs au sujet percevant, déclenchent l’activité sensorielle, en produisant à l’intérieur de l’âme une activité visuelle et auditive correspondant à chacun d’entre eux”.59 Thus, she appears to fail in making ἄμφω (being the activities) refer to the objects τὸ ὁρατὸν καὶ τὸ ἀκουστόν.
Finally, (ix) Taormina construes διακρίσις to include more than cross-modal distinction, involving the coordination of perceptible forms of different senses by the rational soul, while taking perception by a single sense (viz. κρίσις) as a mere transformation of an affection into an intelligible form (i.e., activation of a form) in the soul. This account is perhaps coherent, although I doubt it is Plotinus'.60 Elsewhere, he identifies perception itself as a κρίσις61 made by the soul; and as I argue in sections 2.1 and 2.2.3, the Possession Aporia implies that the κρίσις presupposes the activation of forms in the soul, so the two processes cannot be identical. I will argue that the activation of forms is initiated by the sense organ rather than the soul, so it cannot be the κρίσις, which is attributed to the soul. So, I take all κρίσις as propositional and relegate the enunciative role described by Taormina to the sense organ as a prerequisite to perceptual judgement. Notably, this account is compatible with taking the subject of κρίσις and διακρίσις to be the same and even to be a perceptual power (as discussed at the end of section 2.2.1).
2.2.3
In my proposal (D), I keep the text as Taormina (with ἔνεισι) while avoiding grammatical difficulties (ii) in understanding περὶ τοῦτο, περὶ ὃ, and in my preferred alternative, (iii) taking ἄμφω as referring to τὸ ὁρατὸν καὶ τὸ ἀκουστόν. I also (ix) keep κρίσις to be a propositional judgement which indeed presupposes the activation of perceptible forms in the soul and understand διακρίσις as an additional phenomenon of cross-modal distinction and (vi) making the passage emphasise a point relevant specifically to this question. Again, I (vii) connect the lines with the parallel in III.6.1–2 neatly; and (iv), (viii) fit the passage into the internal logic of chapter IV.6.2, while (v) keeping consistency with other works. First, let me specify Plotinus' account, then turn to the textual issues.
As suggested above concerning (1) διακρίσις, Plotinus solves how we can distinguish white and middle C by taking seeing white and hearing middle C as activities of the soul, which the soul can be aware of and so can also distinguish without being affected. In other words, Plotinus seems to suggest that cross-modal distinction is made by distinguishing the perceptual acts in the different modalities. In this account, it is crucial that the activities are internal to the soul, for only inner contents – which the soul possesses – can be judged by the soul, as the Possession Aporia implies. So, the point made in 2.3–6 is an additional reason to adopt the power account of perception by considering a phenomenon besides perceiving a single quality, so (viii) it fits neatly to the aporia and the power account set out in 2.1–3 and (vii) in III.6.1.1–14.62 Also, 2.6–9 follows it naturally by stating the hesitation to adopt this account and, after all, supposing some affection of the soul in being activated by the external object. Moreover, (v) this account avoids appealing to a characteristic of hearing that does not apply to seeing but is entirely general about sense perception and in line with Plotinus' position elsewhere. Let us turn more closely to the content of the passage to assess the other points, notably (ix) the account of διακρίσις, (vi) the relevance of internality in the account, and (iii) the denotation of ἄμφω.
While I argued that cross-modal distinction is explained in terms of perceptual acts concerning the objects white and middle C, the ‘perceptual act’ is ambiguous between judging “a is white” and having white(ness) been activated. By the latter, insofar as it is in the soul, I mean not a separate act of activation that can occur without judging but a prerequisite to it that can nevertheless be distinguished in analysis.63 Yet, according to Plotinus, the form's activation in the soul depends on its activation in the sense organ. We shall turn to these complexities below. As we have seen, Alexander calls perceiving the qualities “activity of the sense power”, just as the transmission of the affections “activity of the peripheral sense organs”. He also explained the cross-modal distinction in terms of the transmission activity. Analogously, we might take the activities here to be (D1) the judgement of the soul or (D2) the activation of white(ness) and middle C(ness) in the soul.64 Crucially, both end up being in the soul; hence, whichever is meant, (vi) their internality will be a relevant point in the argument. However, I take it that Plotinus means “activation”, mainly for the following three reasons. First, (a) this makes his account analogous to Alexander's; second, (b) the alternative would not fit so well as an answer to the aporia in 2.1–2; third, (c) this will give a resolution of the problem with ἄμφω that no other interpretation was able to provide.
Suppose (D1) the activity is perception itself, viz. judging that “a is white” and “b is middle C”. One could argue that the soul distinguishes the judging activities and thereby distinguishes white and middle C. As we have seen, (a) this is not Alexander's account. Again, (c) this renders the activities, hence the reference of ἄμφω to be seeing and hearing τὸ ὁρᾶν καὶ τὸ ἀκούειν, as in the alternative interpretations. Most importantly, though, (b) while on the face of it, this involves only items internal to the soul, hence seems relevant to solve the Possession Aporia, it does not further support Plotinus' power account. Instead, it presupposes the success of the power account, that is, that the soul already possesses the content of the judgements of hearing and seeing. This only shows that an explanation of cross-modal distinction becomes possible using the power account.
Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ ὄψις καὶ δυνάμει οὖσα καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ [35] ἡ αὐτὴ τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ἡ δὲ ἐνέργειά ἐστιν οὐκ ἀλλοίωσις, ἀλλ’ ἅμα προσῆλθε πρὸς ὃ ἔχει τὴν οὐσίαν65 καὶ ἔστιν εἰδυῖα καὶ ἔγνω ἀπαθῶς, καὶ τὸ λογιζόμενον οὕτω πρὸς τὸν νοῦν ἔχει καὶ ὁρᾷ, καὶ ἡ δύναμις τοῦ νοεῖν τοῦτο, οὐ σφραγῖδος ἔνδον γενομένης, ἀλλ’ ἔχει ὃ εἶδε καὶ [40] αὖ οὐκ ἔχει· ἔχει μὲν τῷ γινώσκειν, οὐκ ἔχει δὲ τῷ μὴ ἀποκεῖσθαί τι ἐκ τοῦ ὁράματος, ὥσπερ ἐν κηρῷ μορφήν. Μεμνῆσθαι δὲ δεῖ, ὅτι καὶ τὰς μνήμας οὐκ ἐναποκειμένων τινῶν ἐλέγετο εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτω τὴν δύναμιν ἐγειράσης, ὥστε καὶ ὃ μὴ ἔχει ἔχειν. Τί οὖν; [45] Οὐκ ἄλλη ἦν πρὶν οὕτω μνημονεύειν καὶ ὕστερον, ὅτε μνημονεύει; ἢ βούλει ἄλλην; οὔκουν ἀλλοιωθεῖσά γε, πλὴν εἰ μή τις τὸ ἐκ δυνάμεως εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἐλθεῖν ἀλλοίωσιν λέγοι, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν οὐδὲν προσγενόμενον, ἀλλ’ ἥπερ ἦν πεφυκυῖα τοῦτο ποιοῦσα. Ὅλως γὰρ αἱ ἐνέργειαι τῶν ἀύλων [50] οὐ συναλλοιουμένων γίνονται· ἢ φθαρεῖεν ἄν· ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον μενόντων, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν τὸ ἐνεργοῦν τοῦτο τῶν μεθ’ ὕλης. Εἰ δὲ ἄυλον ὂν πείσεται, οὐκ ἔχει ᾧ μένει ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ὄψεως τῆς ὁράσεως ἐνεργούσης τὸ πάσχον ὁ ὀφθαλμός ἐστιν, αἱ δὲ δόξαι ὥσπερ ὁράματα.
For just as sight, which has both a potential and an actual existence, remains identical in its substantiality, and its activity is not an alteration, but it simultaneously approaches that in relation to which it has its substance and exists in a state of knowing and has got to know without being affected; in the same way, too, the reasoning part is related to Intellect and sees, and this is the power of intellection; there is no stamp impressed on it internally, but it possesses what it sees and in another sense does not possess it, it possesses it by cognising it, but does not possess it in that there is not anything put away in it from the seeing,66 like a shape in wax. And we must remember that memories too, in our account of them, do not exist because things are put away in our minds but the soul awakens the power [of memory] in such a way as to possess what it does not possess. Well, isn’t the soul different before it remembers in this way, and afterwards, when it remembers? Do you want to call it “different”? But, then, it isn’t altered, unless one were to call the transition from potentiality to actuality an alteration. But nothing is added to it; rather, it just does what it is by nature. For, in general, the actualisations of immaterial things occur without any accompanying alteration, otherwise they would perish; it is much truer to say that they remain [unaltered when they become actual], and that being affected in actualisation belongs to things which have matter. But if something immaterial is to be affected, it does not have anything in which to remain. Just as in sight when seeing is active, the eye is what is affected, and opinions are acts of seeing. (III.6.2.34–54)67
Plotinus appeals here to the two ways of being present in the soul – as an impression, affection, seal in the wax on the one hand, and as cognition or knowledge that does not involve affection (ἀπαθῶς), see III.6.1.9–11 – and elaborates on the latter notion: cognitive presence.68 Most importantly, it implies the identity of the cognitive power in its alternation between being exercised and rest.69 That is, the cognitive power remains the same power (‘in its substantiality’) both when not in use (potential existence: I sleep or shut my eyes, so I am not seeing) and in being exercised (actual existence: my eyes are open and I am seeing). Moreover, the transition (or actualisation, τὸ ἐνεργοῦν) of the power from rest to activity (ἐκ δυνάμεως εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἐλθεῖν: at opening my eyes my sight gets activated) keeps the power unaffected, as it is just performing its natural function.70 While the soul itself, being immaterial, has only this kind of cognitive actualisation, Plotinus keeps the door open for material things to be actualised and affected at the same time. This is indeed the case with sense organs – like the eyes in seeing, cf. III.6.1.2–3 where the affection is of the body so qualified (τοιόνδε σῶμα) – which have an intermediate status between external perceptible objects and the perceiver subject, the soul (IV.4.23.19–35; cf. I.1.7.1–6; IV.3.26.5–8; IV.4.18–19, 28; IV.5.1.6–13, 28–29; IV.9.3.23–27; VI.4.6.8–11).
So, following this account, I propose (D2) that the activity used to account for cross-modal distinction in IV.6.2.3–6 is the activation of the qualities (white, middle C) in the soul rather than the judgement made using these activated qualities (as contents of the judgement). The advantages are clear. First, (a) it seems that activation of the power for Plotinus takes the role of transmission in Alexander's account. Without the details, both of them call the respective activity “reporting” – ἀπαγγελία in Plotinus (IV.4.23.26–31) and διαγγέλλειν in Alexander (de An. 63.28–64.4; 64.17–20; Mantissa 15, 141.33–36; 142.31–143.3; 145.20–25; also διάδοσις, e.g., de An. 39.20–21, 48.12–21, 63.16; in Sens. 59.10–15)71 – the result of which is the presence (activation) of the relevant perceptible form in the sense power.72 Thus, since Alexander accounts for cross-modal distinction in terms of transmission, it is plausible that Plotinus, who seems to be influenced by Alexander's account of simultaneous perception, does so in terms of the analogous activation. Second, (b) cross-modal distinction using activations of forms constitutes an additional reason to adopt the power account besides the power account's purpose as a solution to the Possession Aporia, which concerns the perceptual judgement. The soul can distinguish the ἐνέργειαι as activations of white and middle C (and so the qualities themselves) independent of making judgements “this is white” and “that is middle C” since the activations are prerequisites for the judgements, hence logically prior to them.73 Moreover, it seems the activations, as reporting, are initiated by the soul-like component of the sense organs74 (IV.4.23.19–35; cf. IV.4.19.4–7, 11–15) and so related to a subject different from the perceiving and judging soul itself.
Most importantly, (c) if the activity in question is the activation of the perceptible form, it is meaningful to call the perceptible object itself ‘activation’. When it is seen, the external white activates the form of white in the soul. On the Aristotelian account, the activation happens when an active and a passive power meet, and then the activation is one and is present in the passive recipient.75 On Plotinus' account, the activation cannot be in the soul because it is unaffected. However, the sense organ is affected so that the activation can be present in it. And, Plotinus continues, besides being affected, the sense organ also reports the form to the soul, but now without any modification (IV.4.23.22–31; cf. 19.26–29). Thus, the form becomes present also in the soul. Gathering these points, I suggest that cross-modal distinction (IV.6.2.3–6) is possible using the activations of the forms in the soul that relate to the activations in the sense organs. Even though Plotinus is silent on the latter aspect of the perceptual process in IV.6, he mentions at 2.16–18 the affections (πάθη) in the sense organs of taste and smell where no external medium exists. If this is correct, these activations in the sense organ – being one with the object perceived – can be called “what is perceived”. So, the reference of ἄμφω can be τὸ ὁρατὸν καὶ τὸ ἀκουστόν.76
While I prefer account D2 (ἐνέργεια = activation of power and form) because it gives a better sense than D1 (ἐνέργεια = judging), Plotinus' argument is very condensed, so it is impossible to decide between them based on the text. Compared to the other alternatives, even though D1 (ἐνέργεια = judging) does not have D2's advantage of (iii) having the obvious denotation for ἄμφω, this would not count as a disadvantage either since all alternatives have τὸ ὁρᾶν καὶ τὸ ἀκούειν: (A) and (B) explicitly and (C) tacitly. Concerning all other factors mentioned, D1 and D2 are equally favourable. One more point about D2 (ἐνέργεια = activation): even if admitted, the brevity and opacity of the text do not allow taking this account for granted in what follows in IV.6.2.
2.3 Lines 2.6–9
We have seen that Plotinus provides his account of perception in terms of active powers (2.2–3) in reply to an aporia (2.1–2) stemming from the denial of the impression theory (2.1), and he provides a reason to adopt this view, namely, that it explains cross-modal distinction (2.3–6). In the following lines, Plotinus appears to cite a common opinion (maybe alluding also to Plato himself)77 that is contrary to the thesis of the preceding lines. Accordingly, perception seems to involve some affection (πάσχειν) or stroke (πληγῇ), which suggests rendering the soul in perceiving or cognising (γινώσκειν) its object as being controlled (κρατεῖσθαι) by rather than controlling (κρατεῖν) its object.
This points to a serious difficulty again: while the perceptual judgement as an activity is possible because its contents as well are present as activities in the soul (the point of 2.2–6), it is not yet clear how the contents about the external world come to be present as activities in the soul. For example, seeing a white thing and making a judgement ‘the object out there is white’ is possible because (among other things) white(ness) is present in the soul as an activity. However, it is not clear how white(ness) is activated in the soul in the first place.78 Reasonably, white(ness) is activated exactly due to seeing the white thing, so plausibly, the external white thing activates white(ness) in the soul. Thus, even though perception is a judging activity and the soul makes judgements using items within itself, at this point, it still seems that the activation of the items within (viz., the contents) depends on the external object, and so it is a kind of affection.79 I shall call this the “Control Problem”.80
To avoid this conclusion, Plotinus needs to make clear not only that contents are activities in the soul but also how the contents can be activated without the soul being affected. He does not solve this problem directly here, however. He only provides one step toward a solution: as we will see, he separates the active role of the perceptual power from the passive-affective aspect that he assigns to bodily components (2.10–18).81 His considered solution appears to be scattered elsewhere in different passages (most importantly III.6.2.32–54 summarised above and IV.4.23; cf. I.1.7; I return to this in section 3), so perhaps Plotinus found it sufficient for his immediate purposes to allude to it here (esp. III.6.2.32–54) by following the line of argument of III.6.1–2. As he is probably most interested in memory in IV.6,82 he only cites facts about perception on which he will build his account of memory.
2.4 Lines 2.10–18
In considering the passive aspect of perception, Plotinus turns to hearing first (2.10–16), then taste and smell (2.16–18). While the process of hearing is said to be the same (τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον) as the one considered in the preceding, taste and smell seem to differ in a way (note δὲ) while having the same basic aspects of the process: a passive and an active one. Plotinus' point is not straightforward, though. (1) It is unclear what hearing is compared to and how one should understand the account of hearing involving affections in the medium to get it consistent with Plotinus' account elsewhere. (2) The comparison of hearing to reading needs clarification. (3) It seems problematic that taste and smell involve affections (πάθη). Let me discuss these points in turn, and then we will see how this section moves Plotinus' reasoning forward.
(1) The suggestion that hearing involves an affection in the air – viz. in the medium of hearing – seems to be at odds with the account in IV.5.5.83 For Plotinus argues there that the intervening air – in which the stroke (πληγή) is supposed to be – is not needed for hearing and it is accidental;84 indeed it creates an obstacle for the process of hearing. Most importantly, just as for seeing (IV.5.2.50–53, cf. IV.6.1.28–32), it would make the affection in the medium what is perceived rather than the external object itself. Yet, in 2.10–16, Plotinus probably admits there is a stroke in the air as a matter of fact, without reflecting on the possibility of the absence of intermediate air as irrelevant in context.85
Be that as it may, if hearing involves affection, it seems to differ from seeing. We have learned in IV.6.1 that sight does not involve affection in the perceiver, and in IV.5.1–4 that it does not involve affection specifically in the medium. Perhaps the claim that “the process is the same in the case of hearing” refers not to the affection involved. It might suggest some distance between the object and the perceiver, as it was argued in 1.23–26.86 The points of the two passages, however, would be exact opposites: how distance is perceived, supposing there is none (1.23–26) vs. how the power is activated if the object is at a distance (2.10–16). One may presume, instead, that the analogy concerns the visual metaphor of ‘reading’.87 Then, seeing would be an immediate grasp without any affection needed (it would grasp the visible objects out there), and hearing would be explained as an indirect grasp of the object mediated by an affection that the soul grasps directly (namely, ‘sees’, as it were). All perception but vision would then be indirect, which would give vision a strong logical primacy. While an attractive reading, the phrasing and the position of the claim suggest that the aspect which is ‘the same’ is the stroke instead. Since the ‘stroke’ has just been introduced as a common view in 2.7, and it will be said that hearing does involve a stroke, it is natural to take ‘the same way’ as referring to the previous lines, thus not comparing hearing to seeing. Again, Plotinus says, “the process (γίνεσθαι) is the same in the case of hearing”, but reading should not be a process but an activity (ἐνέργεια).
Thus, the hearing process seems to be the same insofar as it involves a stroke or affection. So then, it seems Plotinus continues the Control Problem set out in 2.6–9 by offering a partial solution. Admitting the stroke in the air, the soul remains unaffected and active: the affection being external to it88 and its role being a sort of reading activity. The sameness of the soul throughout the process is stressed by the identification of the subject as the ‘power’ (δύναμις) and the ‘substance of the soul’ (ψυχῆς οὐσία), which reflects III.6.2.34–35 cited above. So, even though the Control Problem is not solved, it is avoided as it does not introduce passivity in the soul.
(2) But what does it mean that hearing is “something like reading the impressions inscribed on the air” (οἷον ἀναγνῶναι τοὺς τύπους ἐν τῷ ἀέρι γεγραμμένους, 2.14–15)?89 And why does Plotinus say that the impressions need to “come near and reach the point at which they can naturally be seen” (ἐλθόντας πλησίον, εἰς ὃ ἐλθόντες πεφύκασιν ὁρᾶσθαι, 2.15–16)? Perhaps the object seen must be close enough to allow for clear differentiations of distinct properties (cf. IV.4.23.15–1890), which is presumably needed for reading. But for reading a text, distinct perception is insufficient: the subject must attend to the text and its sense (IV.4.8.9–16; V.1.12.1–14;91 cf. I.4.10.24–26). Perhaps hearing is similar to the reading activity insofar as the soul needs to pay attention to the sounds of interest, not to miss them in the constantly floating noise (see esp. V.1.12.14–17).
(3) Let us turn to taste and smell, which explicitly involve affections (πάθη). In these cases, the position of the affections does not help avoid the Control Problem directly, for they are in the body. One may suggest the body is external to the soul, after all, so the affection in it does not make the soul as well affected. While this is probably Plotinus' view (V.3.2.2–6; cf. IV.4.24.23–25),92 such a premise would beg the question at this point. Recall that Plotinus argued forcefully in IV.6.1 that the perceptible object cannot be in the same place as the perceiver. Some arguments require the perceiver to include the perceiver's body (IV.6.1.23–28, 32–40). Thus, the bodily affections of taste and smell should pose to stop Plotinus.
Unfortunately, we are left with conjecturing since Plotinus was not interested in these sense modalities. He only offers the basic, widely held facts about them (considering them together): their object is flavours (taste) and odours (smell) with intensity (VI.4.11.12–14; VI.3.17.1–8; II.8.1.24–25; cf. IV.4.26.17–20 about the senses of Earth); their organ is the tongue (taste) and the nose (smell) (IV.3.23.6–7). In any case, taste and smell93 are secondary and distracting for the soul (IV.4.25.11–13). The distraction might be due to their closeness to the body and to the fact that their function relates to fulfilling bodily needs and achieving bodily pleasure, like eating (IV.4.20.1–10; cf. 24.1–12), without which one easily gets angry (IV.4.28.35–43). So, the affection (pathos) in their case – in the perceiver's body – works like pleasure, pain, and emotions, unlike in hearing and seeing. So, perhaps we could appeal to Plotinus' account of pleasure and pain (in IV.4.18–19; cf. on emotions in IV.4.28) to get clearer about taste and smell.
Nevertheless, in IV.6.2, he is satisfied with making the standard distinction – familiar from III.6.1 and consistent with the above passages – between the activity of the soul (judging κρίσις and cognising γνῶσις) and the passive affection of the body. In context, this seems satisfying, indeed. First, this avoids – at least dogmatically – the Control Problem. Second, Plotinus can move forward with considering intellectual cognition which is without any affection. So, we can see his approach as ordering cognitive activities according to the passivity and affection involved in the process: vision – hearing – taste and smell.
2.5 Lines 2.18–24
Having considered how the senses operate – in particular, distinguishing an active and a passive aspect in the process (2.10–18) – Plotinus, somewhat surprisingly, turns to the cognition of intelligibles (τῶν νοητῶν ἡ γνῶσις). However, since his goal was to defend the thesis that perception is a cognitive activity of the soul rather than a passive affection or impression, the point about intellectual cognition becomes understandable.
Just as he provided (in 2.10–18), as it were, an ordering of the sense modalities according to the nature of the passivity and affection involved in their process – taste and smell involving affections in the body, hearing affections in the medium, and seeing perhaps even less or no affection –, now he asserts that intellectual cognition involves no affection or impression at all (ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀτύπωτός ἐστι μᾶλλον).94 Moreover, he connects this feature of intellection to the characteristic of intelligibles that they, “in a way, issue forth from within” (ἔσωθεν οἷον προπίπτει) in contrast to perception, which looks outside (2.19–20, cf. 1.14–23). For, as we have seen, looking outside and acquiring information thereof invites the idea of affection or at least some external item on which the whole process depends (2.6–9). Even if the dependence of the perceptual activity does not preclude that the soul as a subject is unaffected – the passive affection being of something else (2.10–18) – intellectual cognition lacks even this dependence, and so does the involvement of this indirect affection. For, as I have suggested, perception of an external X (judging something about X) not only requires that the subject of perception (the soul) turns outside towards X, but also that X itself is relevant in activating the capacity of the soul to make a judgement involving X (one might identify this capacity as the concept of X). Even though this activation of something in the soul is not an affection of the soul, the activation still depends on the external item. While intelligibles might be considered as in a way external to the soul95 – insofar as they come from Intellect, which is above the soul – this point seems not to be Plotinus' in this passage. For he says, even the dependence of the power's activation on something external (as in perception) is removed in intellectual cognition. Since the soul itself can activate the objects for itself: “for, the cognition of intelligibles is of itself, and it is itself the activator of each of its objects” (αὑτῆς γάρ, καὶ ἔστιν αὐτὴ ἐνεργοῦσα ἕκαστον, 2.21–22).
Moreover, the point in these lines becomes even more evident if we consider Plotinus' overall goal in the treatise. It is reasonable to think that this goal is to construe memory as an activity independent from the body and for which the soul alone is responsible, that is, construe it as an intellectual activity. Given this goal, it is quite relevant for him to settle the status of the cognition of intelligibles as “unaffected and impressionless”. Thus, this point (surprisingly, it might appear) is indeed relevant both in completing an ordering of cognitive activities relative to their dependence on affections (started in the preceding lines 2.10–18) and in looking forward to the account of memory as a cognitive activity of the soul alone in chapter IV.6.3. Indeed, he connects thinking intelligibles to memory as the soul “knows them by being them in a way: for it knows, not because they settle in it, but because it has them in some way” (γινώσκει γὰρ τῷ αὐτά πως εἶναι· γινώσκει γὰρ οὐ τῷ ἐνιζάνειν αὐτά, ἀλλὰ τῷ πως ἔχειν αὐτὰ, IV.6.3.12–13; cf. 3.10–19).
Plotinus does not stop at the soul's cognition of intelligibles. He moves to the cognition the soul can have of itself – “the soul sees itself as two and as another” (αὑτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ δύο καὶ ὡς ἕτερον ὁρᾷ, 2.22–23) – and even of the intellect – “sees intellect as one” (νοῦν δὲ ἓν καὶ ἄμφω τὰ δύο ἕν, 2.23).96 Perhaps he means that the latter involves more unity insofar as the soul recognises that intellect is identical with its contents, whereas the soul's cognition of itself is of something not entirely the same as itself because the soul most properly itself is an intelligible entity (cf. IV.6.3.5–16).97 Plotinus adds the soul sees “both of the two aspects as one” (καὶ ἄμφω τὰ δύο ἕν – 2.23–24), presumably referring to the case when the soul cognises itself as cognising the intellect.98 Of course, since an incorporeal subject itself does these cognitive activities, they by no means involve affection, so Plotinus does not need to consider them in any detail. Thus, he is justified in merely mentioning these activities and referring to other discussions.99
3 Plotinus' account of perception and IV.6.2
As we have seen, IV.6.2 opens by alluding to a thread of reasoning in III.6.1–2. The chapter proceeds from the thesis that perception is not impression (2.1 – III.6.1.1–4), from which the Possession Aporia follows: how can the soul judge something it does not possess (2.1–2 – III.6.1.6–8). Plotinus' proposed solution for the aporia – the power account – is indicated but not explained (2.2–3 – III.6.1.8–11). Instead, diverging from III.6, he provides a further reason to adopt the power account: it explains cross-modal distinction (2.3–6). Then, he points to another serious difficulty, the Control Problem: How can the soul power be activated by the perceptible object without being affected by it? (2.6–9, cf. III.6.1.32–37; IV.4.23.3–8). The issue is, again, unresolved (unlike in III.6.2.32–54 and IV.4.23.19–43). Plotinus takes only one step towards solving it by allocating affections externally or to the body while the judgemental activity to the soul (2.10–18). Finally, he ascends to pure intellectual activities of the soul that do not involve external items, only the soul's own contents, so there is no reason to think there is affection: the soul itself can activate them (2.18–24). While the last point might seem like an appendix to the discussion of how perception works, it is pertinent to examine memory in the following chapter. Since memory is supposed to belong to the soul alone (IV.3.26; cf. IV.6.3.3–19, 70–71), it should be considered in analogy with the cognition described in 2.18–24. Thus, we might understand IV.6.2 – or even the whole discussion of perception in IV.6.1–2 – as preliminary to the main target of IV.6 to identify memory as an activity of the soul alone.100
Seeing the unity of the chapter, we might ask how it coheres with what Plotinus says about perception elsewhere. First, as the chapter's first part alludes to and presupposes the account of III.6.1–2, they are consistent. There seem to be three points where IV.6.2 goes beyond III.6: (1) cross-modal distinction, (2) the specifics of hearing, and (3) the ordering of sense modalities. In addition, the chapter is (4) a clear statement of the power account of perception, which (5) replaces the predecessors' impression theory; so, we should see what this account amounts to and how it coheres with Plotinus' views appealing to impressions in the sense organs. I briefly comment on these aspects in conclusion.
(1) Plotinus discusses cross-modal distinction elsewhere (IV.7.6, cf. section 2.2.1) to refute corporealism about the soul. In 2.3–6, he argues that the power account is needed to account for this phenomenon, which gives independent support for his power account of perception. (2) In 2.10–16, we learn about two features of hearing. First (as a matter of fact), it involves an affection or stroke in the air, which approaches the subject of hearing. Second, hearing itself is an activity of the soul that requires selective attention to the sounds around the subject. (3) While Plotinus often compares perception and higher types of cognition in their dependence or lack of dependence on the body and its affections, in 2.18–24, he provides an ordering of the different sense modalities and the soul's different intellectual cognitions too. (4) The power account of perception renders perception itself as an activity of the soul. But, besides looking out (1.15–23) and attending (2.13–16), the soul must be actualised to achieve its nature at a higher level of completion. (5) But the soul power's actualisation – which is required from the metaphysical point of view – can be accompanied by affections, provided the affections are of different subjects. Plotinus specifies some types of affections in sense perception: some external to the perceiver's body (strokes in the air), some within the body but closely related to pleasure and pain (πάθη of taste and smell). However, the actualisation of sense powers seems to allow affections in the perceiver's body, although this has some implications. First, the perceiver's body must be taken as external to the perceiver soul. Second, the affection must be closely tied to the actualisation of the soul power: it should be taken as the actualisation of a perceptible form in the sense organ that transmits or reports the form to the soul to enable perceptual judgement.
In conclusion, while the brevity of the chapter and its dependence on previous discussions (esp. III.6.1–2) make it not very useful “as a key to the interpretation of other passages”, this is not so much due to its obscurity, but to its allusive nature. It is noteworthy, though, that at the beginning of the chapter, Plotinus seems to provide some reason for holding the power account (although Emilsson does not find any such reasoning in Plotinus101). Moreover, the individual points Plotinus makes in the chapter – while some appear to be in tension with what he says elsewhere – are entirely consistent with his considered view. More than that, we could find the coherence of the chapter in a line of thought ascending from perception that somehow depends on external objects to intellection as pure activity of the soul – finally, this ascent is made to enable the discussion of memory in the latter terms.
Funding information
The paper has benefited from the financial support of the Hungarian National Research, Development and Innovation Office (NKFIH: project OTKA-138275).
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Péter Lautner for discussions on Plotinus' Enn. IV.6 occasioned by work on its Hungarian translation and his insightful suggestions and criticism of earlier drafts of this paper. I also thank László Bene and Ágoston Guba for their comments on the paper. All remaining errors are my responsibility.
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He only cites IV.6.2 seven times together with other passages in making general points like perception is judgement or activity. Once, Emilsson (1988) 124 justifies the immediateness of perception by citing IV.6.2.14, where hearing is said to be like reading – yet he does not interpret this passage in context. He also supports that perception is direct contact with the object and that the perceptual affection and activity take place at the object by IV.6.1.16–17 solely, Emilsson (1988) 79. This passage, however, need not be understood to imply this (I owe this point to Péter Lautner, and I attempt to substantiate it elsewhere).
Since memory depends on some preceding cognition (see IV.3.25.10–13, 26.10–12), it is clear how it is a reactivation of that cognition, see Lautner (2024). Perception, however, is a type of cognition being at the beginning of the cognitive life of an individual, so it is unclear how it could be an activation of an already possessed capacity, Emilsson (1988) 133. The most plausible solution is that the capacity is innate and remains latent until activated, Emilsson (1988) 132–137; Chiaradonna (2012) 193–194, 203–206. Magrin (2010) 283–286 emphasises the limited scope of innate concepts required: being, sameness, difference, beauty, goodness, which is indeed reinforced by Emilsson (2021); cf. Roreitner (2023) 236–237. For an interpretation which connects latency with the rationality of perceptual judgement, see Helmig (2012) 186–204, which Emilsson (2021) disowns. Against the latency reading, see Noble (2016) 240–242. The issue goes well beyond IV.6, so I do not intend to examine it here.
The problem and the possibility of this reading of 2.3–6 are suggested to me by László Bene. Some, e.g., Emilsson (1988) and Chiaradonna (2012) defend direct realism, while others, like Blumenthal (1971) 71–72 or Magrin (2010), argue for indirect realism.
The chapter is usually interpreted as being against physical impressions only. See, e.g., King (2009) 111–113; Nikulin (2014) 189–191; Emilsson (1988) 76–78, 143–144. Plotinus rejects physical impressions indeed in the polemic context against the Stoics' corporealist account of the soul in IV.7.6.37–49, cf. III.6.1; IV.3.26.29–34.
Leaving open the possibility of impressions in the body. See, e.g., Zeller (1881) 583; Blumenthal (1971) 71–72; Taormina (2022a) 43–47; Kalligas (2023) 154.
Emilsson (1988) 81. Also see Clark (1942) 359–360; Bonazzi (2005); Taormina (2019).
I aim to provide a detailed study of this question elsewhere.
I cite the editio minor with changes indicated and defended: Henry–Schwyzer (1977) (abbr. H–S2). The translation is based on Armstrong (1984), and it is modified by Gerson (2018).
H–S2 print „·”, so they consider the clause as an assertion of Plotinus' view. This is followed by all translators I studied. However, Creuzer (1835) 838 and Ficino (cited by Creuzer) take this as a question. Creuzer changes the accentuation of Ἢ to Ἦ, but this is not necessary (it might indicate an unstated disjunction: “[It works like this (i.e., involving impressions),] or else, does the soul speak about things that it does not possess?” I defend this reading in section 2.1.
H–S2 print ἔπεισι, which is a conjecture of Sleeman (1928) 29. I propose to retain the manuscript reading ἔνεισι, following Taormina (2019) and Taormina (2022a). For the argument, see sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3.
Rejecting – with Taormina (2022b); cf. Taormina (2022a) 245–247 – the emendation to νοῦς by Harder–Theiler–Beutler (1967) 412. I am indebted to Ágoston Guba for pressing me on this point.
The unstated subject supplied rightly, although not unanimously; for alternative suggestions, see Taormina (2022a) 92, n. 6, cf. 53–54.
Armstrong's translation modified, Armstrong (1967).
Compare Alex. Aphr. de An. 64.1, where the reason why judging (κρίνειν) of heterogenous percetible objects is possible is the possession of them. This strengthens the connection between Plotinus III.6 and Alexander's account noted by Roreitner (2023) 236.
Dillon (1990) 22 and Helmig (2012) 187 capture the aporia well, and the translations of Armstrong (1967), Bréhier (1925), and Harder–Theiler–Beutler (1962) indicate it. It is not usually discussed sufficiently, however, for example by Noble (2016). Kalligas confuses this aporia with the parenthetical regress argument in III.6.1.4–6, see Kalligas (2014) 539–540; similarly obscured in the translation in Gerson (2018) 307. Emilsson (1988) 110 neglects the aporia, taking the passage to indicate that perception results in incorporeal representations, rather than being about a precondition of perception – while he argues for the precondition of latent forms at ibid. 132–137, based primarily on VI.7.6, V.3.3–4, and IV.3.30. A different problem, that of being determined by the object of perception, is identified by Laurent (2004) 215 n. 6; Fleet (1995) 76 seems to understand the aporia this way too. This is certainly related to the problem but is implied by Plotinus at III.6.1.32–37 (see Dillon [1990] 23) and stated clearly at IV.6.2.6–9, on which see section 2.3.
The defender of the “restatement interpretation” might say that IV.6.2.1–2 indeed states this: the soul “speaks about things that it does not possess [as physical impression and affection]”. But, again, while this is a possible reading, it is still at odds with III.6.1, where the point is that the soul must possess what it judges.
One might try to defend the “restatement interpretation” by pointing to III.6.1.32–37, where Plotinus seems to suggest that after all “the soul possesses them without possessing and is affected without being affected” (ἔχουσαν οὐκ ἔχειν καὶ πάσχουσαν οὐ πάσχειν, line 36). This might suggest that the soul can have perception of things that it does not possess, cf. Taormina (2022a) 12–13. Three considerations against this suggestion: first, it concerns affective states like pleasure, pain and passions (III.6.1.21–25); second, the formulation of the hypothesis as an oxymoron suggests that it is indeed impossible in the literal sense (cf. Gerson (2018) 308, n. 7); third, Plotinus postpones the evaluation of this hypothesis (III.6.1.37), presumably to III.6.2.29–54, to be discussed in section 2.2.3. Cf. Fleet (1995) 85–86; Noble (2016) 272.
László Bene pointed out to me that the γὰρ in the sentence following ours would be pointless if it is understood as a question. Perhaps the text is elliptic, and we should understand something like “[It does possess its contents, but differently, as a power.] For this is a characteristic of power…” Considering the parallel with III.6.1, this seems acceptable.
Remes (2007) 138 argues, based on VI.7.39.5–9, that διακρίνειν is the distinguishing act of intellect specifically, but also of διάνοια and relates to dialectic. This entails, according to Taormina (2022a) 59, that the subject of διακρίνειν must be the rational soul. However, in the context of IV.6, I do not find this warranted.
Perhaps Gerson (2018) 483; Morel (2007) 385.
See Taormina (2022a) 54–60; Armstrong (1967) 325; Bréhier (1927) 173; Igal (1985) 479.
II.8.1; III.6.1.1–4; IV.3.3.20–25, 26.8–9; IV.4.22.30–33; 23.36–43; IV.6.2.17; IV.9.3.26–27; VI.4.6.8–19, cf. IV.3.23.31. Perceptual judgement (κρίσις) is also a kind of awareness (ἀντίληψις): e.g., I.1.7.9–16; IV.4.23.1–5; IV.5.1.6–7, 4.13–14. Compare Hutchinson (2018) 93–99, 179–182.
II.6.2.17–22, 3.1–2, 3.15–16; III.6.4.41–42; IV.2.1.34–39; IV.4.23.1–4; V.5.7.2–3. The perceptible forms or qualities of bodies depend on their internal formative reason principle λόγος or substantial nature: II.4.8.24–30, 9.7–12; II.6.1.20–23; III.8.2.19–34; IV.4.11.16–23, 29.33–40; IV.7.4.30–34; V.9.12.9–11; VI.3.8; cf. Emilsson (1988) 52–53. The qualities are indeed images of this λόγος. So, by grasping the perceptible qualities of a body, one grasps its λόγος too, although indirectly: II.4.5.18–19; III.6.13.31–32; V.9.3.27–37, 5.17–20, 13.4–5; VI.3.15.24–38; cf. V.5.1–2; Emilsson (1988) 119–121. This relates to incorporeal intelligible representations of λόγοι or forms that are internal to soul (and constitute it), cf. Emilsson (1988) 133–137. On the epistemological and causal-metaphysical roles of λόγοι, see Rist (1967) 84–102; Kalligas (1997); Kalligas (2011); Brisson (1999); Karamanolis (2009); Remes (2007) 68–90; van den Berg (2010); Helmig (2012) 186–195.
In setting out the problem and its relevant details I appeal to my study, Hangai (2020). Compare Emilsson (1988) 94–106; Taormina (2022a) 48–60; Roreitner (2023) 224–228, 232–235. For the problem in Aristotle, see esp. Marmodoro (2014) 156–263; and Gregoric (2007) 129–162; and in Plato, see Modrak (1981); and Cooper (1970).
He clearly considers the question invoking Alexander's discussion elsewhere, see note 35.
Cross-modal distinction treated in these passages is later called διακρίσις or διακρίνειν by commentators of Aristotle, e.g. Phlp. in de An. 13.4–7, 17–20; 461.11–13; 483.25–26, 29; Ps-Simp. in de An. 198.31–34.
Cf. IV.7.6.10–11; Alex. Aphr. in Sens 163.6–17, and Hangai (2020) 102–103, 115.
On this requirement, see Hangai (2020) 100, 102–104. See also Enn. IV.7.6.3–15, where Plotinus explicitly discusses the phenomenon, cf. IV.3.3.13–20.
Plotinus criticises theories of perception that involve the transmission (διάδοσις) of perceptual stimuli at IV.2.2 and IV.7.7 (cf. IV.4.19), although explicating the theory in Stoic terms of progressive affection of one part to adjacent part, see Koch (2009). He maintains, instead, that since the soul is present as a whole in the whole body and in each of its parts, it can be aware of affections in any bodily parts. See IV.4.19.11–19; IV.7.7.23–29; cf. III.4.6.34–38; IV.2.2; IV.3.3.9–20; 19.8–19; IV.9.3.10–24; Blumenthal (1971) 72–75; Emilsson (1988) 60–61, 102–106; Hutchinson (2018) 57–62.
De An. 63.12–20; Quaest. III.9, 97.10–19; Hangai (2020) 118–119; Emilsson (1988) 100. For the same idea in Plotinus, see the previous note. While Plotinus likely borrows the idea from Alexander – although the Stoic soul also pervades the whole body through total blending, LS 48C10; 53B6, cf. Koch (2009) 104 –, he criticizes Alexander's hylomorphic account in IV.7.85.5–9; Emilsson (1988) 104.
On these passages, see Hangai (2020) 108–111, 117–119.
For Alexander on perception as ἀντίληψις and κρίσις, see de An. 39.4–5; 46.20–21; 50.9–11; 53.26–54.2; 55.12–14; 60.2–3; 61.24–27; 63.28–65.1; 84.4–6; passim; in Sens. 8.13–14; 10.19; 167.21–22; passim; Quaest. III.9, 97.25–27, 98.6–10; in Metaph. 312.1–3; 316.4. On this terminology in Alexander, see Caston (2012) 139–140, n. 346; on ἀντίληψις, cf. Hutchinson (2018) 179–182. The κρίσις terminology goes back to Aristotle (de An. II.11, 424a1–10; III.2, 426b8–427a15; III.3, 427a20–21; 428a3–5) and Plato (Tht. 186B).
In agreement with Emilsson (1988) 105, although he considers IV.7.6, esp. 3–15. Plotinus' appeal to Alexander regarding this issue is scrutinized by Henry (1960) 429–444, cf. Bonazzi (2005) 206–215; Taormina (2022a) 50–53.
On different kinds of (and terms for) consciousness in Plotinus, see Hutchinson (2018); Remes (2007) 96–110; Warren (1964); Schwyzer (1960).
Taormina (2022a) 58–59 also refers to this passage, cf. note 21. Magrin (2015) argues that for this purpose, Plotinus posits a kind of common sense, which suggests a Peripatetic affinity. However, she takes it as a rational power responsible also for the consciousness of thoughts, which demolishes the Peripatetic answer. Moreover, she identifies it as an all-encompassing power of consciousness, τὸ ἀντιλαμβανόμενον, but Plotinus seems to be unhappy with such a faculty of the soul in IV.3.29.
See Magrin (2015) 876–882 with further references. Compare Chiaradonna (2012) 202, who argues (based on V.3.3) that διάνοια is required even for the awareness of perceptual content; cf. Blumenthal (1971) 105–106.
Probably because the visual and auditory impressions were of the same kind, cf. Clark (1942) 360. Even so, it is not clear why the soul would be unable to make the distinction. For, the different impressions were present in different sense organs (cf. Clark (1942) 371): visual ones in the eyes, and auditory ones in the ears. And the soul should be able to detect where they were – in which sense organ – just as it is able to localise pain by localizing the bodily affection, IV.4.19; cf. IV.7.7.23–29. But the sense organ determines also what kind of qualities they are affections of (different sense organs are apt to receive information from different kinds of qualities, IV.3.3.20–25, cf. 22.15–17, 23.1–21). Thus, while Plotinus considers the same phenomenon of cross-modal distinction in IV.7.6.8–11 (see note 35), his objections against explaining it – and simultaneous perception – based on physical impressions judged by a single extended subject (IV.7.6.15–19; for the more general divided subject, cf. 6.20–37) – presumably the Stoic theory – are irrelevant for our purposes, that is, concerning an impression-theory that maintains an incorporeal subject, viz., Alexander's account (which Plotinus seems to recite against the Stoic view in IV.7.6.3–15). Cf. Emilsson (1988) 101–106.
Taormina (2022a) 54–60.
For a full account, refer to Taormina (2019) and Taormina (2022a) 160–161, 241–245.
Sleeman (1928) 29. Moreover, according to him the text would contradict IV.6.2.1–2 that claims the content is not present in the soul. As we have seen these lines can be understood to say the contrary.
H–S2.
Harder–Theiler–Beutler (1967) 412. For the problems with it, see Taormina (2019) 204.
Sleeman (1928) 29; Armstrong (1984) 325; Igal (1985) 479. Compare Gerson (2018) 483: “activities relative to what presents itself to them”.
Morel (2007) 385, 392, n. 17. This is also suggested to me by Péter Lautner.
Also Bréhier (1927) 173.
H–S2, 132.
Pace Taormina (2019) 207, who emphasises Plotinus' denial of the identification of the object of perception as an impression. While Plotinus does deny this, he also denies the more general point that any impression in the perceiver is needed to explain perception: and this can be expressed as “perception is not an impression”, as Plotinus himself does in IV.6.1.1–2.
Morel (2007) 392, n. 17.
It is argued that λόγοι are used in sense perception as criteria against which perceptibles are judged, see e.g. van den Berg (2010); cf. note 25.
Notwithstanding, Noble (2016) 241–242 notes concerning III.6.2.36 that approaching the special object is an important aspect of explaining how the sense power is active in perception. Again, Plotinus considers it possible that we are affected by the object without perceiving (judging) it, when the soul turns to (attends) something else, see IV.4.8.9–34, cf. 25.1–3; Emilsson (1988) 86–87; Hutchinson (2018) 69–71; Warren (1964) 84–86, 95. Schwyzer (1960) 369–372. I do not pursue this idea further in this paper.
Plotinus mentions seeing and hearing the same object and seeing different parts of a single object, like a face, in IV.7.6.3–11. The latter example, however, turns out to be perceiving different objects: the nose and the eyes of the face.
Plotinus does not specify the phenomenon he considers. Provided that he is influenced by Alexander's account of simultaneous perception (see section 2.2.1) we might appeal to Alexander's discussion of the Problem of Opposites. In his solution Alexander considers judgements where opposite qualities are predicated of different subjects (“x is white” and “y is black”) which does not constitute “opposition in judgement”; hence such judgements can constitute a complex judgement of simultaneous perception of opposites (Alex. Aphr. in Sens. 167.22–168.2; Quaest. III.9, 97.28–35; de An. 64.12–17; cf. Hangai [2020] 112–115). For a helpful taxonomy of simultaneous perceptions, see Macpherson (2011).
Taormina (2019) and Taormina (2022a) 160–161, 241–245, cf. 36–60.
Taormina (2022a) 54–60.
Taormina takes this to imply that the object of perception (τὸ αἰσθητόν) is an activity within the soul that has two aspects, one related to the subject soul, the other to the external body perceived. This, however, is not Aristotle's view: according to him, it is the perceptual activity (αἴσθησις) that has the two aspects indicated, see Arist. de An. III.2 425b26–426a19; Ph. III.3. Compare Magrin (2010) 276–278, who points it out that Plotinus takes the activity (which is the external activity of the λόγος of the perceived body) to be both in the object and in the perceiver. While perceptible objects are indeed activities, as Taormina (2019) 207–211 points out (cf. Taormina [2022a] 171; Kalligas [1997] 402–403), this is insufficient for her interpretation. She needs the objects to be internal to the soul. However, Plotinus is explicit in the passage Taormina refers to (IV.6.2.18–22) that perceptible objects are external (cf. Taormina [2022a] 172), which is quite relevant in context, as this renders perception more dependent on what is outside, hence more dependent on impression than intellection: on this see section 2.5. Thus, the activity of perception is intermediate between bodily affections and the affectionless intellection. However, as Plotinus makes it clear elsewhere, the subject of any aspects involving affections is not the soul itself but the ‘so qualified body’ (τοιόνδε σῶμα) or the sense organ, an intermediate entity (III.6.1.1–3; IV.4.23.19–35; IV.9.3.25–27; cf. section 2.2.3).
Taormina (2022a) 42, 241.
Taormina (2019) 213. For the reasons, see note 49.
Cf. Magrin (2023).
See note 24.
While this account provides further support for taking IV.6.2.1–2 as a question, it is compatible with the “restatement interpretation” as well.
As an analogy, consider the referring act in the speech act theory: while indispensible in any locution with propositional form, it cannot occur but in the context of a locutionary act (and an illocutionary act, for that matter). I take this analogy helpful considering that just as “referring” relates to a part of the locution, the activation of “whiteness” relates to part of the perceptual judgement “x is white”. So it is a sort of perceptual concept; or an enouncement of a term, as Taormina (2022a) 58 suggests.
Blumenthal (1971) 74–75 suggests that Plotinus incorporates transmissions in his theory as “translation into incorporeal forms” and connects this to the role of nerves. While I agree with the former, I doubt the latter.
See Fleet (1995) 97; Noble (2016) 240–242; Bréhier (1925); Igal (1985); cf. King (2009) 115. Most interpreters excise τὴν οὐσίαν and read “it simultaneously approaches what it has.” E.g. Harder–Theiler–Beutler (1962); H–S2; Armstrong (1967); Emilsson (1988) 131–133; Laurent (2004); King (2009) 118; Gerson (2018). This is unfortunate, as often strong interpretation – innatism – is based on this reading, as it is acknowledged by Emilsson (2021) 119–120; cf. van den Berg (2010) 172–173.
The word ὁράματος can also mean what is seen, or the affection made by the object on the perceiver, cf. Laurent (2004) 217, n. 31.
Translation of Armstrong (1967) modified using Gerson (2018).
Compare Noble (2016) 244–245, who takes these as two ways of having properties in general. I do not find this generalisation warranted, as Plotinus appeals to the distinction only to show that the soul has its cognitive contents without being affected.
So it is an act (ἐνέργεια, cf. IV.3.23.1–21) for creating (ποιεῖν) as described in VI.1.22.1–10; (cf. VI.1.15–22) and also elaborated in II.5.2–3. Plotinus bases his account in III.6.2 on Aristotle's notion of actualization, which is not to be called an alteration properly speaking, only in a metaphorical sense (Arist. de An. II.5, 417a14–b28; cf. Alex. Aphr. Quaest. III 2, 81.4–82.20; III.3, 83.15–84.33); cf. Emilsson (1988) 126–133; Emilsson (2021) 119–120; Fleet (1995) 94–100; King (2009) 124–126. Compare Noble (2016) 232–234, 238–254, who argues that Plotinus does not depend wholly on Aristotle's distinction but appeals to the distinction – found in Pl. Phdr. 245C–246A; Lg. X 895E–896B – between the soul's capacity to activate itself and the body's capacity to be changed by external source. According to Noble, Plotinus allows that the soul changes, although the change is an ἐνέργεια that is fully controlled by the agent, and so does not count as affection. While Plato's reasoning, no doubt, lurks in the background, Noble's discounting Aristotle's influence seems to depend on his tendentious reading: he shows, at most, that Plotinus' distinctions are not the same as Aristotle's.
Cf. III.6.3.27–32; II.5.2.15–26; I.1.2.
For discussion and further references, see Caston (2012) 141–142 n. 352; The two terms, together with others, seem to be interchangeable, pace Roreitner (2023) 227.
The earlier Platonist Alcinous also claims that perception involves reporting (ἀπαγγελία), see Alcin. Intr. IV.4.
Compare Noble (2013) 265. Cf. note 62.
Cf. Noble (2013), arguing the soul trace is an immanent form dependent on the individual's vegetative soul.
Arist. Ph. III.1–3.
My D2 and Taormina's accounts appeal to activated forms in the soul. However, Taormina considers διακρίσις possible because the forms are made immaterial in the soul by κρίσεις of particular senses. Whereas in my account D2, this is possible because the activations of the forms in the soul are ἐνέργειαι of the soul following upon the activations of the forms in the sense organs, which are partly affections and partly ἐνέργειαι insofar as they report the forms to the perceptive soul. Based on the reports (activated forms), the soul can make perceptual judgements (κρίσεις), and based on the reporting, it can make cross-modal distinction (διακρίσις). Crucially, my account separates the activation of the forms from the perceptual judgement (κρίσις): two aspects conflated in Taormina's account. I intend further develop this point in another study.
Taormina (2022a) 162 refers specifically to the idea that perception comes about as an interaction of an active and a passive power, found in Pl. Tht. 156A–C, 159C–D, 179C. The point in Plotinus is rather that the perceptual power seems to have some dependence on what is external, hence some passivity, as I argue in the main text. This is corroborated by the use of stroke (πληγῇ) in line 7, which invokes Plato's account of hearing at Tim. 67B, where the affection is said to reach the soul eventually. Plotinus, just as virtually all philosophers, as Emilsson (1988) 50–51, 65–66 notes, include a passive element in perception to explain contact with the external world and that perception is about present objects: see IV.4.23.19–32; cf. IV.5.1.6–13.
It remains unclear even in interpretation D2 of 2.3–6, as I noted, and in every other account as well.
In other terms, the perceptual capacity seems to be a passive potency that requires something else to activate it, as described in II.5.2.33–35; II.5.3.28–31; cf. Corrigan (2017).
The problem also seems to be explicated in III.6.1.32–37, see Dillon (1990) 23. Cf. I.1.3.11–17; IV.4.23.1–8 with Emilsson (1988) 68–69.
Edelhoff (2017) shows that this is Plotinus' solution for apparent affections of the soul: in bodily pleasure and pain, desires, and passions. This account, however, depends on perception and awareness of bodily affections as activation of a power without any passivity. Compare the more nuanced account of Noble (2016) 266–272, insisting that Plotinus' strategy is to distinguish passions as activities pertaining to the soul and passive states which are only the bodily passions.
See, e.g., Blumenthal (1971) 81–83; Igal (1985) 473; King (2009) 123 n. 525; Kalligas (2023) 155.
The difficulty is noted by Igal (1985) 479, n.7; but missed, e.g., by Kalligas (2023) 154 ad loc.
Esp. IV.5.5.5–8. It seems, however, that a continuous medium is needed, otherwise, the World would not be a living being to allow for συμπάθεια, IV.5.2.26–31, 3.15–21; cf. Clark (1942) 365; Gurtler (2015) 245–247.
At VI.1.5.5–12, Plotinus seems to state that the sound is indeed a stroke (πληγή) or impression (τύπωσις) in the air. Here, again, the context is the question of how the voice can be a quantity, and the discussion is polemic against Aristotelian views. So, the possibility considered in IV.5.5 that there is no air in the medium to be affected is irrelevant here. Cf. VI.4.12.1–28.
Taormina (2020) 110.
Cf. Taormina (2022a) 165–166.
And so located elsewhere, in line with IV.6.1.37–39, as Taormina (2022a) 166 emphasises.
I am grateful to Ágoston Guba for discussing this point and stressing me to elaborate my interpretation.
See Blumenthal–Dillon (2015) 394.
See note 52.
Externality of our body is understood as some otherness (Kalligas [2023] 272), comparable to externality to a given soul power (Remes [2007] 103–107), specified as ontological difference by Perdikouri (2016) 225.
It seems right to delete ‘hearing’ καὶ ἀκούειν in IV.4.25.11–12; cf. Kalligas (2023) 101.
Literally, the cognition of intelligibles is more (μᾶλλον) impressionless than perception, not that it is altogether impressionless, as Perdikouri (2016) 225–226 emphasises. To avoid contradiction, she understands the passage to be about the exteriority of the objects of different kinds of cognitions rather than the involvement of impressions. Then, the point would be that perceptibles are more exterior to the soul than intelligibles. While this would make sense for comparing perceptibles and intelligibles in general (as it is done in V.5.1, cf. Chiaradonna (2012) 196, n. 23), the comparison crashes when different kinds of perceptions are considered (IV.6.2.10–18), for it would imply that according to Plotinus, the objects of touch and taste are more exterior than those of hearing and seeing, which seems groundless.
E.g., V.3.2.7–11, 4.14–16; IV.3.12.33–34; cf. Blumenthal (1971) 108; Chiaradonna (2012) 200; Perdikouri (2016) 224–228; Hutchinson (2018) 104. This interpretation has been suggested to me by Péter Lautner and László Bene.
Taormina (2022a) 173 connects this remark to memory: soul seeing itself corresponds to perceptual memory and soul seeing the Intellect to memory of thoughts. This is unpersuasive, for memory of thoughts seems to correspond to cognition of intelligibles and not of itself, and soul's cognition of itself is by no means cognition of external perceptibles.
Cf. III.8.8.1–8 with Hutchinson (2018) 120–122; IV.8.3.25–27; V.1.3.15–19; Remes (2007) 173.
Cf. Taormina (2022b) 158–160; Taormina (2022a) 246–247.
Perhaps IV.4.2, as Taormina (2022b) identifies, although other suggestions have also been made, e.g. V.6.1–2.
Note that chapter 3 alone is longer than the sum of chapters 1 and 2. Perhaps Plotinus' interest in perception, in general, and in vision, in particular, stems from using these questions to illuminate thinking and intellection, cf. Blumenthal (1971) 68–69.
Emilsson (1988) 130.
