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  • 1 Bolyai Institute, University of Szeged Aradi vértanúk tere 1, H-6720 Szeged, Hungary
  • 2 Department of Statistics, University of North Carolina New West, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3260, U.S.A.
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Summary General linear combinations of independent winnings in generalized \St~Petersburg games are interpreted as individual gains that result from pooling strategies of different cooperative players. A weak law of large numbers is proved for all such combinations, along with some almost sure results for the smallest and largest accumulation points, and a considerable body of earlier literature is fitted into this cooperative framework. Corresponding weak laws are also established, both conditionally and unconditionally, for random pooling strategies.

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