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)| false ( – Guerrini, C. J. – Robinson, J. O. – Petersen, D. McGuire, A. 2018): Should Police Have Access to Genetic Genealogy Databases? Capturing the Golden State Killer and Other Criminals Using a Controversial New Forensic Technique. PLoS Biology 16( 10). 10.1371/journal.pbio.2006906
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Most, but not all. Some externalities are co-committed, e.g., traffic congestion.
I am only concerned about risk that is attributable to the behavior of the agents being insured. In saying this, I am not precluding these risk considerations from an insurer's calculus. The model described here does not depend on ignoring these features; it just says nothing about them at all.
This means that high-risk customers are free-riding on low-risk customers.
One can move toward the Pareto frontier, without that movement being a Pareto improvement (Buchanan and Tullock 1965).