Despite the growing amount of scholarly works on Central and Eastern European (CEE) populism, economic perspectives of the phenomenon can still lead to new research questions. As the volume Economic Policies of Populist Leaders. A Central and Eastern European Perspective (edited by István Benczes) presents, virtually all CEE countries have experienced some kind of populist rule since the Global Financial Crisis. Additionally, as the editor convincingly argues within Chapter 2, the supply side of populism (i.e. what do populists actually do once elected) is not coherently researched and explained, thus a more nuanced scrutiny is needed to understand how populist rule alters the institutional landscape of an economy. These are two main aspects that give this book great relevance.

Economic Policies of Populist Leaders is the finished product of the multi-year, international and multidisciplinary Horizon 2020 project ‘POPREBEL – Populist rebellion against modernity in 21st-century Eastern Europe: neo-traditionalism and neo-feudalism’. Authors of the book are scholars with diverse backgrounds representing several different countries from the CEE region.

The book offers to assess the economic side of contemporary populism by focusing on the consequences of populism (i.e. economic policies implemented by populist governments), and it does not intend to offer a comprehensive analysis of the economics of populism or explanations for the rise of populism in CEE. As the editor mentions in the introduction, this is in response to Rovira Kaltwasser, who urged economists to study the economic consequences of populism. The book is structured into two main parts: the two chapters of the first part provide the conceptual framework and an overview of contemporary populism in the CEE region, while Part II presents nine country-specific case studies and summarizes the lessons learned in the last chapter.

One major strength of the book is the coherence of the conceptualization of populism and of the analytical framework. The ideational definition of populism is applied consistently throughout the chapters, with reference to Cas Mudde's work. This definition has gained centre stage in political science and focuses on the separation of society into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’, a view in which politics should express the general will of the (pure) people. Additionally, all case studies focus on similar questions: the effects of populist takeover on the economy; major forms of changes; redistributive, institutional and regulatory implications; effects on long-term economic perspectives, etc. Chapter 2 presents the rationale behind the conceptual framework of the book while emphasising the highly flexible and adaptable nature of populism, and explains how contemporary populism can be characterized by a disregard of the institutional constraints of economic decision-making as these constraints are seen as obstacles to serve the electorates' will.

Chapter 4 opens the second part of the book with the first country-specific case study: Benczes shows how Hungary, under the long years of Viktor Orbán's populist rule, has not engaged in unsustainable and irresponsible economic policies (at least not until the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic), however the government applied redistributive policies that have substantially changed the government's budget, and interfered with the competitive market mechanisms whenever it served their political interests. Economic policies (e.g. special taxes on specific sectors) were in line with the ideational approach: the division between ‘us’ (i.e. the people who should be protected) and ‘them’ (i.e. multinationals who should bear the burden of fiscal consolidation and other foreign agents) is an integral part of the government's rhetoric. Despite the more recent excessive government spending (especially ahead of the 2022 general election, which is reminiscent of economic populism), the conclusion of Hungary's case is that contemporary populism is not necessarily about neglecting the budget constraint, instead, the disregard of the institutional constraints of economic decision-making becomes apparent.

In Chapter 11, Cornel Ban undertakes a similar analysis of Romania's political economic context in the 2010s. Despite the spectacular success in GDP growth since 2010, Romania still experiences a massive social, educational, infrastructural and innovation deficit compared to other CEE countries. The rule of a nationalist, nominally socialist-democratic party (i.e. the PSD governments between 2016 and 2019) with populist rhetoric could have offered to strengthen the fiscal positions of the country with tax reform to support spending on human development, but instead it further emaciated the fiscal state of the country. These years of populist rule have brought sectoral taxes (banking, energy, telecom, similar to those implemented in Hungary), and dynamic wage growth that boosted consumption, at the expense of current account and budget deficits. Ban sees national-neoliberalism as an attempt to defend the interests of domestic capital against foreign capital, under a populist rhetoric, and describes how Romanian populism is a strong force in politics and policy.

Chapter 10 (co-authored by Gábor Kutasi and Denis Ivanov) stands out from the series of country case studies with a quantitative analysis of growing external imbalances in the Baltic countries, where a “new type of macroeconomic populism” is highlighted, which is indicated by the erosion of current account (CA) deficit by the appreciating real effective exchange rate (REER). The authors argue that the appreciating REER (expressed by the unit labor cost) led to increasing CA deficit and weaker GDP growth, which can be considered as a policy failure in Estonia and Latvia. This quantitative assessment is complemented by a mini-case study of Lithuania, where (i) this REER-CA relationship does not seem to hold, and (ii) the coalition government of two populist parties (one left-leaning and one right-leaning, governing between 2012 and 2016) implemented an economic nationalist populist policy mix consisting of workforce activation (with a drastic increase in the minimum wage) and sovereignty (via anti-refugee campaign).

The rest of the chapters ensure that no country from the CEE region is neglected. In Chapter 5, Joanna Orzechowska-Waclawska shows how the economic policies of the right-wing Law and Justice party in Poland, under a populist and anti-elitist narrative, led to redistributive and modern protectionist policies (e.g. the repolonisation of the banking sector). In Chapter 6, Karel Svoboda describes the two types of populism that co-existed in Czechia after 2013: the technocratic populism of Andrej Babiš that lacks a consistent nationalist ideology, and the traditional populism of president Miloš Zeman. Authored by István Kollai and Bence Bánki, Chapter 7 highlights the populist economic policies implemented in Slovakia (including the renationalization of companies in strategic industries and the adoption of distortionary measures). Chapter 8 (Dženita Šiljak) discusses the populist policies of Slovenia's major political figure, Janez Janša: his anti-migration policies might be considered typical for a populist, however, he is also portrayed a Europhile who has led his country into the Eurozone. In Chapter 9, Viktória Endrődi-Kovács aims to explain why Croatian populist parties emerged, with special attention on Most, an anti-establishment party that refrained from macroeconomic populism. Chapter 12 by Urangoo Bulgamaa presents the Bulgarian puzzle: despite the existing pre-conditions of left-wing populism (deep poverty and income inequality), the country experiences right-wing populism; additionally, the chapter highlights how the rise of populism has led to the erosion of institutional quality.

Finally, Chapter 13 by István Benczes draws some conclusions based on the evidence collected from the series of case studies. Two main arguments seem especially convincing: (i) based on the minimalist definition of populism, the CEE experience proves that populism can take many different forms, and (ii) all cases within the region showed that populist rule has a strong appetite for both income and wealth redistribution. All these different populist parties set up the line between “us” and “them” differently, creating cleavages along cultural, migration-related, and nationalistic lines or based on the idea of national sovereignty.

Macroeconomic data shows that in general, populists have indeed refrained from unsustainable macroeconomic policies. However, the redesign of the regulatory and institutional framework has deteriorated the perception of corruption in the region (Lithuania being the only exception). While classical economic populism is usually associated with economic crisis and political collapse, in case of contemporary populism, the relatively healthy macroeconomic indicators help to hide the medium- and long-term costs of economic policies.

Economic Policies of Populist Leaders has many interesting perspectives which would be appreciated by a wide audience of scholars from political science to economics, or by anyone interested in the socio-economic and political development of the CEE region. Despite the broad and informative array of case studies, the generalizability of findings appears to be somewhat limited, however, these country analyses show not only that the region is a fertile ground for populism, but also that populism can take many forms, and thus the study of economic consequences can enhance our understanding of the variety of existing populism(s).