Abstract
The study of sub-systems tends to be a disadvantaged endeavour within the discipline of International Relations. While the global level of analysis attracts more attention, contradictions in assumptions embraced by IR surface most readily on the sub-systemic level. This was the case with ‘Regional Power Research’ (RPR), a systematic study of post-Cold War emerging powers. RPR conceptualised emerging powers as autonomous regional powers and hypothesised that they would provide security as a public good within their regions. None of RPR's hypotheses could be confirmed empirically. The paper first provides a historically contextualised insight into the assumption of anarchy underlying RPR's hypotheses, and deconstructs the concept of public goods. It then presents findings from a longitudinal qualitative content analysis of the 1990–2021 national security strategies issued by the United States. Findings show that the world order that prevailed when emerging powers rose was markedly hierarchic, precluding autonomous security provision, an inherently hierarchic endeavour, by sub-global powers. Emerging powers embraced adaptive strategies and the global distribution of capabilities shifted. Findings confirm the need to ground hypotheses in empiricism, realigning regional and global level power research to reflect the changing degrees and spatio-temporal distributions of anarchy and hierarchy in the international system.
1 Introduction: Post-Cold War regional power research and key assumptions underlying
With significant shifts in the global order, new research domains emerge within International Relations (IR). Such was the rise of middle power research when the number of states proliferated after the Second World War (Holbraad 1971). Similarly, after the end of bipolarity, regions and regional powers gained prominence in IR research. This interest intensified with the rise of emerging powers in the first two decades of the 21st century. While theorists embrace new fields of research amid major international transformations, underlying assumptions about the nature of global politics informing theories and hypotheses have remained largely unchanged.
This article takes issue with the assumption of anarchy by theorists in what Jorge Garzon (2022) referred to as the Regional Power Research (RPR) Program. Appearing with the rise of emerging powers, RPR was a systematic study of the emerging powers1 theorized as regional powers that provide “security as a public good” within their respective regions. In regional power researcher Nolte's (2010: 890) words, ‘Regional powers, in contrast to middle powers,2 have to bear a special responsibility for regional security and for the maintenance of order in the region.’3 RPR could not confirm this to be the case. Emerging powers were deemed neglectful or reluctant to fulfil this role. Eventually, RPR declined.
In his critical overview of RPR, Garzon (2022) argues that RPR's unfruitful outcomes stem from two key flawed assumptions: first, that regions and states are uniform, and second, that global level hierarchic influences can be ignored when examining emerging or regional powers. While Garzon recommends integrating Comparative Regionalism to address the former, this article explores the assumption left unexamined by Garzon, that of global level hierarchic influences in the post-Cold War world.
Embracing the widely prevalent Waltzian notion of anarchy (Waltz 1979), RPR conceptualizes the nature of international politics as sovereign entities interacting on an equal footing in perpetual competition. Perpetual competition is evidenced by history, but sovereignty has long been a contested notion, while asserting that entities are on an equal footing needs to be questioned. By presupposing a global state of anarchy post-Cold War, RPR excluded the potential for hierarchy and adaptive behavior on behalf of emerging and/or regional powers.
This article posits that the world order, conceptualised as global,4 is subject to change, and is not inherently anarchic. Moreover, it hypothesizes that the international order in the period examined by RPR was markedly hierarchical, influencing emerging powers to adapt their behaviours accordingly.
This paper first discusses the historical context of RPR and the problem posed by assuming the international system to be inherently anarchic. Next, it presents approaches to the multifaceted concept of public goods in IR directly relevant to the hypotheses of RPR. It then presents findings from a longitudinal qualitative analysis of US national security strategies issued post-Cold War to determine:
whether there was an obvious and systematic effort on behalf of the United States to build and dominate a world order;
the United States' concept of power supporting such a role;
explicit strategic intentions regarding regions and other powers, and
U.S. perceptions of ‘other’ powers as reflected in the choice of expression and interpretive context used in the texts of the strategies.
Findings reveal that the post-Cold War world order exhibited hierarchical, rather than purely anarchic characteristics. They also capture changes in the temporal and geographic patterns of hierarchy and anarchy, suggesting that anarchy and hierarchy are two extremes of the same continuum, unevenly distributed across time and space. Findings underscore the need for empirical grounding in hypothesizing about regional roles of regional and/or emerging powers based on anarchy/hierarchy patterns within the international system.
2 New order, new vantage point, same assumption?
Interest in regional powers within IR arose when the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed. Tectonic change triggered competing visions for the new order. Francis Fukuyama (1989) suggested that history had ended with the victory of liberal democracy. Samuel Huntington (1993) insisted that conflicts would continue, but in a ‘clash of civilisations.’ Others wondered if unipolarity would be a fleeting moment or last a generation, with a diminished threat of war, before multipolarity inevitably arises (Krauthammer 1990). The possibility appeared real for the US, the erstwhile ‘empire by invitation’ (Lundestad 1986) to expand its ‘benevolent hegemony’ (Grunberg 1990) globally. Amid debates about the changing nature of security and new perspectives of world order, IR scholars largely agreed that the Soviet collapse had granted regions greater autonomy. This led to a new focus on subsystems within IR – a departure from traditional inquiry, with considerable conceptual and methodological challenges, as Robert Kelly (2007) notes.
In 1991, in what he called a ‘speculative article’, Barry Buzan, a prominent scholar in IR and security studies heralded the beginning of the 21st century, and outlined his vision of a transformed international system. Buzan argued that established terms used to describe the world had become obsolete. With the collapse of the ‘Second World’, the notion of ‘Third World’ no longer made sense, so even the notion of ‘First World’ was best discarded. Geographical references to distinguish what had been called the First World from the rest of the world – West versus East or North versus South – were also incoherent. Instead, Buzan adopted the notions of ‘centre’, ‘periphery’ and ‘semi-periphery’, from dependency theory.
Discarding the term ‘superpower’ even for the United States, as its unmatched military power had diminished in relevance due to a lack of a major adversary, Buzan (1991) viewed the US along with China, India and Russia as ‘great powers’. Although the latter three were not part of the ‘centre’, he suggested that they could play a role within their own regions. Concurrently, he said that the periphery was likely to lose influence in the processes ahead, because great power competition for influence and resources had waned. The world he posited had a dual nature: multipolar among equal great powers, and unipolar dominated by a coalition of ‘centre’ nations led by the US, shaping the system's rules and values.
In the same 1991 article, Buzan also proposed to replace the realist notion of power used during the Cold War. Instead of viewing state power as aggregated capabilities culminating in military power, he suggested that in the dramatically altered security environment, where thinking in terms of interdependence came to the fore, players could focus on select components of power to flourish. This concept of disaggregated power had far-reaching effects on the evolution of the international system. If some states adopt a disaggregated notion of power, while others, particularly the US, pursue a realist, aggregated concept, inequalities can increase within the international system.
Cold War realism, epitomized by Kenneth Waltz's (1979) Theory of International Politics is also deeply contradictory. Here, the international system is decentralized and anarchic, in which sovereign entities on an equal footing compete in perpetuity. Yet, within the same international system there are vast differences in the capabilities of states, as shown by the possibility of distinguishing great powers. This inevitably produces a hierarchy, and, by implication, patterns of centralization. In a critical analysis presenting the multiple interpretations of anarchy, Helen Milner (1991) convincingly argues that anarchy is better understood not as absolute, but as a matter of degree, and subject to change over time, as the distribution of capabilities and relations shift within the international system.
Robert Gilpin's seminal work titled War and Change in International Politics (1981) presents an alternative to the Waltzian paradigm, focusing on interactions and processes of adaptation, to which he applies the notion of opportunity cost/benefit to decision making by states. Not only does Gilpin's dynamic approach make processes that drive change in the international system become accessible to analysis, but by focusing on interaction and adaptation, it also enables a look at the international system and hierarchy from within. Its notion of anarchy as applied to the international system, and the notion of centralization attributed to the state both become much less absolute. The very existence of change, civil wars even, within states shows that the assumption of absolute control is untenable. Control over the international system is coveted and even attained to some degree by actors, Gilpin (1981: 28–29) shows. Thus, anarchy, decentralization and actors being on equal footing in the international system cannot be automatically assumed, but depend on the distribution of power and prestige, the latter understood as the perception of strength. Despite Gilpin's insights, his approach remained overshadowed by Waltz's model (Wohlforth 2013).
Waltzian in many respects, but not based primarily on the assumption of anarchy was David A. Lake's hierarchy research, which included the study of regional hierarchies. Lake (2009a) defined regional powers as the providers of security as a public good in a region,5 whether they reside inside the region or not. Lake shows the United States to have been the regional power in multiple regions – Western Europe, Latin America, the Middle East – after World War II, and in the post-Cold War era. Powers that do not provide security in a region do not qualify as regional powers. Embracing a cost-benefit approach, Lake notes that compliance comes at a price for subordinates. However, once a critical mass of followers is obtained, the dominant and the subordinate powers are prone to share a drive to enlarge the regional order, based on the rationale of economies of scale benefitting them both. The more subordinates a leader has, the less costly it will be to expand its order, while joining it will be more attractive. This suggests a linear and potentially unlimited expansion of the order. Emerging powers are not interpreted as regional powers, and in general remain elusive in Lake's paradigm.
Unlike Lake, who derived regional power status from the distribution of military capabilities, RPR designated emerging powers as regional powers. It assumed them to be autonomous and on equal footing even with the US, in an anarchic and decentralized world. It hypothesized them to be providers of security as a public good within their region. Their quest was unfruitful.
Both Lake (2009a) and RPR mention the notion of ‘global overlay’ denoting a constraining effect of the world order upon lesser powers, but both reject applying it post-Cold War, viewing it as an attribute of bipolarity. RPR based its assumption of regional autonomy on ‘precisely the contention that the sudden end of bipolarity had significantly reduced the intensity with which the global power overlay affected regions, thereby making them more relevant and independent stages in international politics’ (Garzon 2022: 11). No concept of global level influence in the post-Cold War era is produced in RPR. Explanations for this omission offered by various authors include the difficulty in defining the global level (Buzan – Waever 2003, in Garzon 2022), and the incompatibility of assumptions (Prys 2010, in Garzon 2022).
Assessing the early post-Cold War international system, Buzan (1991: 451) stated that ‘The deeper reality is that the centre is now more dominant, and the periphery more subordinate, than at any time since decolonization began.’ For anarchy to prevail in this context, the single post-Cold War superpower would have had to renounce its superiority, and abstain from building a world order, an assumption RPR adopts without verification.
3 Security provided as a regional public good
The provision of security – in the military sense6 – as a public good by emerging powers within their regions is central to RPR's hypothesizing. This section examines the multiple facets of public goods in theory to determine if, or under what circumstances, regional powers may be providers of security within their respective regions.
The initial notion of public good provision was applied in the context of the state, but with globalization the concept of global public goods (Kaul et al. 1999) was created, as ones produced in response to threats that required global collective action. They have also been interpreted as benefits provided globally by the unipole (Nye 2002, 2017). The notion of regional public goods appeared some years later (Sandler 2006), denoting regionally consumed public goods, or regionally relevant ones that answer regional challenges, such as fighting contagious tropical diseases.
In IR, public goods are approached from four different aspects: their consumption, availability, provision, and production. Gilpin (1981: 16) adopts Samuelson's widely accepted definition, according to which ‘a public good is one “which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individuals’ consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other individual's consumption of that good”’. This definition focuses on the consumption of public goods. Joseph Nye (2017: 12), and Todd Sandler (2006) define public goods as ‘benefits that apply to everyone and are denied to no one.’ This definition suggests unconditional and unlimited availability. Mancur Olson (1965) defines public goods as collectively produced. Lake (2009b), in one instance, interprets public goods as ‘positive externalities’ or ‘overspilling benefits’, which are non-hierarchically provided by-products. RPR and Lake (2009a) speak specifically of the provision of security as a public good by regional powers on the basis of their superior capability. In Lake's (2009a) theorizing this creates hierarchy. In RPR's hypotheses, this superiority brings about responsibility.
In the intensely hostile conditions of the Cold War, security provision was an obvious public good, and a prerequisite for a power to be regarded as a leader. ‘Empires and dominant states supply public goods (security, economic order, etc.) that give other states an interest in following their lead,’ says Gilpin (1981: 30). Whether this applies post-Cold War needs verification.
RPR hypothesizes security as a regional public good that should be provided by emerging powers as a responsibility that comes with their rise.7 This makes public good provision a relational issue on three counts: between the emerging power and lesser powers within its region, potentially also among regions, as well as between the regional power and the unipole. It is far from obvious if, and under what conditions, autonomous security provision by another power would be accepted by the unipole, or if security provision by an emerging power would be tolerated by lesser powers within its region, or, if security provision by an emerging power would be welcomed in a region other than its own.
Some scholars observe that what constitutes a public good for one group, or state, may be a public bad to others. In his discussion of common good and democracy on Schumpeterian grounds, Peter Gedeon (2013) points out that in a diverse society, what is good for one group may be a public bad for another. In their discussion of the state, Gilpin (1981), a realist, and Andrew Moravcsik (1997), a prominent scholar in the liberal school, both agree that assuming that what is good for one group will necessarily be good for all others would be empirically untenable. If diversity applies within the state, it is ever more so among states, internationally. In the international context, Kaul et al. (1999: 452) proposed to overcome this controversy by defining global public goods ‘as having nonexcludable, nonrival benefits that cut across borders, generations and populations’. Security provision tends to be against someone. Hence, it cannot be viewed as internationally nonexcludable, and to cut across populations. Adversaries or competitors will view security provision by the other as a threat to their own interests.
Dominant states provide order and, in turn, make demands on other states; subordinate states benefit from the order and regard the commands of the dominant state necessary for that order as legitimate and, therefore, authoritative. Key is that both the dominant and subordinate states understand that the dominant state has the right to make certain demands, rooted in its ‘special responsibilities’ for social order, and the subordinate state has an obligation to comply with those commands if made.
On these grounds, there is no reason to assume unconditionality on behalf of the dominant power in the case of security provision. Nevertheless, subordinates are understood to expect to be provided with security, prosperity and order within the hierarchical relationship they are in, for their subordination to be justifiable (Beetham 2013; Nye 2002: 239). As a precondition, however, the relationship needs to be acceptable to subordinates, both economically and sociologically (Gilpin 1981). It also needs to be compatible with their self-perception and identity of the subordinates (Kissinger 1957). Upon this will hinge whether an act that constitutes security provision in one relationship is viewed as hostile occupation in another.
Lake's theorizing (2009a: 38) also implies that the dominant power may view autonomous security provision by a lesser state as revisionist rivalry or insubordination. Sensitive to the notion of hierarchy and change, power transition theory suggests that challenges to the status quo are not to be taken lightly. In his discussion of the US-China competition, Graham Allison (2017) shows that historically the rise of an emerging power, and the fear by the incumbent of losing its status tend to result in war.
Protecting a region from an external threat takes power and influence that reaches beyond the given region. In the context of unipolarity, Colin Flint (2017: 55–56) says that ‘any attempt by another country to create a global geopolitical code [i.e., rise to become a global power] is a challenge to the world leader’ and any such challenge ‘requires a response’.
Hence, the question arises specifically for RPR whether it is plausible for the globally dominant power to cede the role of security provider, which produces hierarchy, to other – in this case, emerging – powers. If we accept Lake's (2009a) thought on conditionality, and assume hierarchy, then the answer is no. If we assume regions to be autonomous, and not subject to hierarchy in the post-Cold War era, then the answer is yes. This question can be answered empirically.
4 Empirics
4.1 Hypotheses
If it can be shown that in the post-Cold War period, the United States as the only remaining superpower was 1.) seeking to shape the world order unilaterally or as the leader of a coalition of states, and 2.) was seeking to keep or increase its superiority to sustain its global role, and 3.) these efforts were publicly and credibly stated, then there will be reason to assume that a world order is not inherently anarchic. Hence, the behaviour of states, including that of emerging and regional powers, and the roles they can fulfil regionally and globally can be conceptualised as adaptive. Research into sub-systemic processes will require the verification of the global context.
In the post-Cold War period, the world order was defined by one globally dominant power that imposed hierarchy.
Security provision as a public good is a hierarchic role, and cannot be fulfilled by lesser powers in a hierarchic system until the distribution of power changes sufficiently in their favour.
Ever since 1986, the National Security Council (NSC) of the United States has been required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act to issue a National Security Strategy (NSS) each year to ensure that the strategies of the various branches of its military, the intelligence agencies, its diplomatic efforts and its economy are integrated. A total of 16 documents were published from 1990, when NSS 1990 pronounced the end of the Cold War, until 2021, when the Interim National Security Strategy Guidance (INSSG) called for the founding of a new world order under US leadership. Figure 1 shows the timeline of the strategies analysed.
The timeline of U.S. NSS documents analysed, by year and the administrations that issued them
Source: author.
Citation: Society and Economy 2025; 10.1556/204.2025.00003
Each new NSS document has been announced and made available by the White House. The strategies issued by former administrations are moved to archives. One such archive is at the Historical Office of the Secretary of Defense. The documents are also available through international archives, such as the Berlin Information Center for Transatlantic Security. At the time of writing, the 2021 INSSG is available on the website of the White House.
Being publicly available official strategic narratives with relevant strategic roles in shaping US action, these documents can be considered readily accessible and credible. What needs to be verified is if they demonstrate clear strategic intent and capability to shape a hierarchical world order, which is what the research presented below undertakes.
This is not to say that the processes of a world order can be reduced to the declared intentions of the leading power(s). Influences other than that of the leading power are obviously present and exert some influence, including upon the leading power. Colin Flint and Peter Taylor (2018) persuasively define ‘world order’ as the sum total of the geopolitical calculations of all geopolitical actors. They point out, however, that not all geopolitical actors have the same degree of influence upon the global processes. The global power will have more influence than a lesser one can have. It will be a decisive influence, whether the world is at peace or at war, whether an order is hostile or not.
4.2 Methodology
The purpose of the empirical investigation is to establish:
whether there was an obvious and systematic effort on behalf of the United States to build a world order and keep its superiority,
what concept of power the United States deemed appropriate,
how the US viewed international public good provision,
what US perceptions of ‘other’ powers are reflected in the choice of expression and interpretive context present in the texts of the strategies.
The methodology used is longitudinal comparative qualitative content analysis of the full body of the 16 documents, to produce an analytical tool that is built up of complete timelines for each variable extracted from the texts. The selection of the variables was guided by the concepts of power and legitimation (Beetham 2013) and literature on geopolitical codes (Flint 2017: 51–78). Umbrella categories of variables were:
the assessment of the relative power position,
key strategic goals,
potential and acute threats,
key strategies and policy tools,
modes of legitimation,
assessments of the efficacy of legitimation, domestic and international.
Within umbrella categories 2 to 6, variables that fitted into the category were introduced if they featured at least once in at least one of the documents. A nuanced approach was used to distinguish variables. Among strategies and policy tools, for example, ‘diplomacy’ was not considered a variable, but any particular mode of diplomacy mentioned in the documents was recorded as a separate variable. This helped produce a database of variables where marking the presence or absence of the given variable for each NSS sufficed to reflect continuities and shifts in US assessments, goals and strategies. Expressions of the same idea with slightly different words were not recorded as a different variable. The NSC of the Clinton administration would use the same formulas in the seven documents it published, while other administrations may state the same idea with slightly different words. For example, if one stated the need to shape the world order to meet US interests and values, while another made reference to values only, both were viewed as expressions of the same variable.
Binary coding was found to be unsuitable for the assessments of the relative power position of the US, as the documents expressed different levels of confidence. The category was broken down into the components of power deemed appropriate as defined in the texts: military, technological, institutional, intelligence, economic, moral superiority, complemented with the degree of social cohesion. These variables were marked on a scale of three, to reflect absolute confidence, moderate confidence or the loss of superiority in the given component.
In umbrella categories 1 to 6, findings were recorded in chronological order, by variable and by NSS. This yielded a total of 122 timelines by variable, showing the appearance, modification, or discontinuation of the various factors. The rows show the presence, absence and continuity of the variables. Columns show the content, by variable, for each of the 16 NSS documents (Table 1).
A separate approach was used for references to the ‘other’. The different terms (regional, emerging, great, like-minded powers, partners) used were recorded by context (friendly, neutral, hostile), and by NSS, also arranged in timelines, to reflect any changes in attitude – or inconsistency in use of terms (Table 2). The terms were found to be used with very high consistency.
Limitations of the approach stem in part from the fact that while other powers can be expected to carefully study and take into account the NSS published by the US, their assessments of themselves, and of the US may differ. The close examination of the security strategies of other powers may provide greater insight, if such documents are made public and linguistic barriers can be surmounted. While the method will not yield absolute answers, it can provide sound estimations to guide the choice of assumptions.
4.3 Empirical discussion
4.3.1 US goals and perceptions of ‘world order’
Finding 1. Throughout the period, the documents reflect a US drive to shape the world order lest it be shaped by others. They show that until 2017, the US reserved for itself the right to act unilaterally if necessary. Furthermore, they indicate that international organizations are subject to reform by the US, and no leadership role is attributed to them. The foundation for these intentions is the unrivalled power of the US. These factors suggest a hierarchical world order of which the US saw itself as the leader until 2017.
Newly ‘freed from its Cold War context’ (NSS 1990: 18), the US saw the situation as one of historic opportunity, where it may shape the international system8 so it conforms to US ‘interests, geopolitical necessities, and values’ (NSS 1990). Alternative formulas used include conformity with US ‘values and ideals’ (e.g., NSS 1991: v.).
The strategies consistently frame the leading role of the US as ‘the ability and a responsibility to shape world events, so that we would not be shaped by them’ (NSS 2001, preface; NSS 2010: 9). Squandering the unique opportunity would be to let down the US as a nation and America as an idea.
The period ends with the statement that there is no return to the hitherto existent world order (INSSG 2021: 7), while the stated vital geopolitical interests of the US, and its drive to keep its leading role in re-shaping the world order, remain unchanged.
Apart from NSS 2017, each strategy reiterates that the US ‘must be willing to act alone when our interests demand it’ (e.g. NSS 2000: iv). The communication of the unassailable and unique possibility of unilateral action confirms a hierarchic view of the international system by the US. Some strategies reflect measures prescribed for the greater inclusion of other countries in institutions of global governance (e.g., the G-20 and the IMF in NSS 2000: 20). In the documents, multilateral institutions (UN, IMF, WTO, World Bank) do not feature in leadership roles, and are subject to reform initiatives by the US when deemed necessary.
Finding 2. Initially, the US-led world order is not viewed as global, despite the undisputed superiority of US power. Shaping the world order denotes the simultaneous creation of a new economic and a security world order. The economic order sought to extend the US-led hierarchy globally, including to former adversaries. The security order sought to prevent the creation of an autonomous security capability by others. The development of autonomous military capability by another power was viewed as a threat. Nevertheless, unintended change in the world order is reflected in the 2010–2021 documents, with the gradual return of great power competition. The goal then becomes the restoration of US superiority and leadership role.
The economic order means gaining ‘access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans and space’ and the promotion of an ‘open and expanding international economic system’ (NSS 1990: 2).
The expressions of the security order shift with time. Initially it rests on the ‘vital interest to prevent any hostile power or group of powers from dominating the Eurasian land mass’ (NSS 1990: 1). The security interest was later rephrased: ‘we seek a world in which no critical region is dominated by a power hostile to the United States and regions of greatest importance to the U.S. are stable and at peace’ (NSS 1996: 7). The wording used by the Trump administration was: ‘We will compete with all tools of national power to ensure that regions of the world are not dominated by one power’ (NSS 2017: 4). Nevertheless, the US having a greater direct dominance or dominant influence on regions persists.
We are developing a broader engagement with the People’s Republic of China that will encompass both our economic and strategic interests. That policy is best reflected in our decision to delink China’s Most Favored Nation status from its record on human rights. We will also facilitate China’s entry into international trade organizations, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade if it undertakes the necessary obligations. Given its growing economic potential and already sizable military force, it is essential that China not become a security threat to the region (NSS 1995: 29).
This indicates that autonomous security dominance by another power is perceived as a threat to the regional order and hence rejected by the US. Later strategies show that ‘necessary obligations’ included giving insight into economic, political, and military activities, and the privatization of the economy. The US supported China's membership in the WTO, expecting the organization to ensure China's compliance (NSS 2000). Neither the elimination of the role of the state in the economy, nor satisfactory transparency materialized. By 2015, China's rise was becoming a concern. NSS 2017 describes at length how both China and Russia had become ‘revisionist’ powers that needed to be dealt a strategic response.
4.3.2 US dilemmas and notion of public goods provision
Finding 3. Security as a public good was provided, hierarchically, by the US. Sharing the economic benefits of the world order was controversial. Other public good provision was the product of collective action led by the US.
Public good provision features throughout the strategies. Most reiterate the immense opportunity to construct global institutions that will help provide security and increase economic growth not just for America and but also for the world (NSS 1996: 3), but the strategies waver as to who the prime beneficiaries should be. Security is extended to the US itself, ‘like-minded nations’, allies and friends. The economic benefits of the system are at times offered to friends and allies (NSS 1991: 5), at other times to US society through the creation of well-paid jobs, as stressed in the strategies of the Clinton administration. Guaranteeing financial stability (NSS 1996, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2010) is deemed a global public good.
The fulfilment of the promises of systemic benefit provision fluctuates and becomes subject to reinterpretation. NSS 2017 accuses the policy of engagement of causing the loss of formerly well-paying US jobs, i.e. a loss of the conditions of prosperity of US society, whilst endangering the US defence capability, i.e. security provision, as the US strategic industrial dependence it evoked undermines the ability to surge.
In an instance of contribution to global public good provision by another power, China is commended for its role in the recovery from the 2008 financial crisis (NSS 2010).
NSS 2010 (p. 34.) is the only US strategy to use the phrase ‘public goods.’ It does so denoting goods that are collectively produced.
4.3.3 The edifice of US power deemed appropriate
Finding 4: The US concept of power appropriate for shaping the world order is complex, structurally defined, and geared to preclude the emergence of rivals in regions.
In all NSS documents, five key attributes of power are deemed simultaneously necessary for the US to be able to sustainably shape the world order:
complexity of power,
the appropriate geographical distribution of its power
domination of all global commons,
possession of power multipliers,
a lack of strategic dependencies.
Complexity requires superiority in the military, economic, technological, diplomatic, and intelligence domains. Integrated into a feedback loop, these domains presuppose and sustain each other. Several strategies explain the connection of military, economic and diplomatic superiority. Primacy in intelligence is explained only once, in NSS 1991 (p. 16) as a prerequisite of leadership: ‘The global reach of American intelligence capabilities is a unique national asset, crucial not only to our own security, but also to our leadership role in responding to international challenges’.
The strategies lay particular emphasis on the geographical distribution of US power. They require the US to have superiority in all components of complex power both globally, and within each ‘key’ region of the world. This intention goes beyond Lake's (2009a) concept of the US being the limited security provider in some regions in the post-Cold War period. What region is ‘key’ to US strategic interests may vary, while the goal of ensuring that no region is dominated by ‘adversaries’ is unchanging.
In all these efforts, a policy of engagement and enlargement should take on a second meaning: we should pursue our goals through an enlarged circle not only of government officials but also of private and non-governmental groups. Private firms are natural allies in our efforts to strengthen market economies. Similarly, our goal of strengthening democracy and civil society has a natural ally in labor unions, human rights groups, environmental advocates, chambers of commerce, and election monitors. Just as we rely on force multipliers in defense, we should welcome these “diplomacy multipliers,” such as the National Endowment for Democracy.
The edifice of US power is premised on a lack of strategic dependencies. Most strategies prioritise energy security. Initially, the US imported oil from the Middle East, which it strove to secure militarily, while seeking to diversify its energy imports. By 1997, the US imported most of its energy from Venezuela. NSS 2006 raises the problem of the ‘oil curse’, defined as the ‘corruption’ of major energy exporters, necessitating the radical reduction of US dependence on foreign energy. Energy dependence also poses an indirect threat to the US-led world order. As NSS 2006 (p. 27) points out, ‘Many countries are too dependent upon foreign oil, which is often imported from unstable parts of the world.’ NSS 2010 calls for energy independence. NSS 2015 reports that the US had become the leading producer of both oil and natural gas. By 2017, America adopted the policy of ‘energy dominance’ (NSS 2017).
The erosion of American manufacturing over the last two decades, however, has had a negative impact on these capabilities and threatens to undermine the ability of U.S. manufacturers to meet national security requirements. Today, we rely on single domestic sources for some products and foreign supply chains for others, and we face the possibility of not being able to produce specialized components for the military at home. As America’s manufacturing base has weakened, so too have critical workforce skills ranging from industrial welding to high-technology skills for cybersecurity and aerospace.
INSSG 2021 adds that China has obtained complex power.
Ambivalent among candidate factors of power required by the strategies is the cohesion of the US's own society. NSS 2010 states that social and political cohesion had been lost, NSS 2015, 2017 indicate a growing issue, while INSSG 2021 speaks of domestic political extremism as a national security threat that requires a response. The strategies are not reconciled as to whether and how to address the problem of faltering domestic social cohesion.
The edifice of US power is shown in Fig. 2. Included in it are two additional components: success, and the domination of morality. Success is an element of legitimation: it makes sense of and validates the use of power. ‘Domination of morality’ involves setting norms, formal or informal: it is the non-military aspect of ‘shaping the world order rather than be shaped by it’. Both success and the domination of morality generate positive feedback loops within the edifice of power, contributing to its sustainability.
The US edifice of power
Source: author.
Citation: Society and Economy 2025; 10.1556/204.2025.00003
US assessments of the world order, the US power position and related strategic goals are summarized in Table 1.
US assessments of the world order, power position, and related strategic goals stated in NSS 1990–2021
 |
Source: author.
4.3.4 US perceptions of regional and emerging powers as reflected in the vocabulary of the strategies
The US strategies are disciplined in their choice of expression, including vocabulary used for other powers. Its terms relevant to RPR are ‘regional power’, ‘regional partner’, ‘emerging power’, and ‘great/major power’. Each denotes a distinct kind of actor, categorised based on their relevance to US strategy, inviting the appropriate US posture toward it.
‘Regional powers’ are states that have strategic relevance and refuse subordination to the US. The term is never used in a neutral or friendly context. For example: ‘The focus of our planning for major theater conflict is on deterring and, if necessary, fighting and defeating aggression by potentially hostile regional powers, such as North Korea, Iran or Iraq’ (NSS 1994: 7).
Through an aggressive and affirmative development agenda and commensurate resources, we can strengthen the regional partners we need to help us stop conflicts and counter global criminal networks; build a stable, inclusive global economy with new sources of prosperity; advance democracy and human rights; and ultimately position ourselves to better address key global challenges by growing the ranks of prosperous, capable, and democratic states that can be our partners in the decades ahead.
‘Emerging powers’ are a set of countries with increasing systemic importance towards which the US posture is differentiated, and changes over time. The term first appears in NSS 2010, while NSS 2006 (p. 26.) was the first to use the term ‘global engines of growth’, denoting India, China, the Republic of Korea, Brazil, and Russia. NSS 2010 lists China, India, and Russia as emerging powers, also dubbed 'other key centers of influence’, or ‘other 21st century centers of influence’, adding Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia as ‘increasingly influential nations’.
NSS 2010 observes the ‘convergence of wealth and living standards among developed nations and emerging economies’ (p. 10), noting that these countries, particularly Russia, are becoming more vocal. ‘New and emerging powers who seek greater voice and representation will need to accept greater responsibility for meeting global challenges” (NSS 2010: 13).
NSS 2010 clarifies that the US maintains its position as provider of security and emerging power may be re-interpreted as a possible threat, unless they give the US insight into their defence capabilities, which are to be kept within limits acceptable to the US. Concerning Russia, it says, ‘While actively seeking Russia's cooperation to act as a responsible partner in Europe and Asia, we will support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia's neighbors' (p. 44).
We will monitor China’s military modernization program and prepare accordingly to ensure that U.S. interests and allies, regionally and globally, are not negatively affected. More broadly, we will encourage China to make choices that contribute to peace, security, and prosperity as its influence rises. We are using our newly established Strategic and Economic Dialogue to address a broader range of issues and improve communication between our militaries in order to reduce mistrust. (NSS 2010: 43)
The text leaves no doubt that emerging powers becoming ‘regional’ ones is out of the question, and that the US would take measures should they attempt to do so.
India is a case apart. Until NSS 2002, it was viewed negatively due to nuclear proliferation concerns and tensions with Pakistan. NSS 2006 indicates some improvement. NSS 2010 (p. 43) embraces India: ‘The United States and India are building a strategic partnership that is underpinned by our shared interests, our shared values as the world's two largest democracies, and close connections among our people’. This differentiated approach to emerging powers later becomes the foundation of US strategy in the Indo-Pacific region.
To achieve a just and sustainable order that advances our shared security and prosperity, we are, therefore, deepening our partnerships with emerging powers and encouraging them to play a greater role in strengthening international norms and advancing shared interests. The rise of the G-20, for example, as the premier international economic forum, represents a distinct shift in our global international order toward greater cooperation between traditional major economies and emerging centers of influence. (NSS 2010: 44)
NSS 2015 was published after Russia's annexation of Crimea, but before its entry in the Syrian conflict. It states that ‘India's potential, China's rise, and Russia's aggression all significantly impact the future of major power relations’ (p. 4). US differentiation between emerging powers had deepened since 2010.
NSS 2017 no longer speaks of emerging powers, but of the return of great/major power rivalry. ‘Great powers’ denotes those with which the US will compete directly. NSS 2017 blames the strategy of engagement for the re-emergence of great power competitors, and for undermining the complexity of US power. It states that ‘Today, the United States must compete for positive relationships around the world’ (p. 38), with Russia and China making advances in the Global South. The 2021 strategy reports that China has obtained complex power, and calls for the founding of a new one, with US leadership.
An overview of the use and context of the terms regional power, regional partner, emerging power and great power is provided in Table 2.
Mentions and context of ‘regional power’, ‘regional partner’, ‘emerging power’ and ‘great power’ in US national security strategies.
 |
Source: author.
5 Conclusions
Through the case of RPR, the paper critically examined the widely held, yet contradictory assumption about the underlying nature of the international system being inherently anarchic. This subfield of IR conceptualised emerging powers of the early 21st century as autonomous and unfruitfully hypothesized them as providers of security as a public good within their respective regions. Being central to RPR's hypothesizing, the multifaceted notion of public goods is presented through the IR literature to show that they are inconsistently conceptualised. Furthermore, security provision in the military sense is shown to be a hierarchic public good, conditionally provided by the dominant power, and conditionally accepted by the subordinate one.
To investigate if the assumption of anarchy applies to the historical context of RPR, the paper presents the findings of a longitudinal qualitative content analysis of the 16 national security strategy documents issued by the United States in the 1990–2021 period. The documents, which have been publicly available and are highly credible, will have informed the strategists of lesser powers. The findings confirm that there was a concerted and explicit effort on behalf of the US to shape the world order to avoid having to conform to demands imposed by others. They show that the US sought to sustain its superiority and thereby continue in its role as the primary shaper of the world order. Throughout this period regional and great powers with autonomous defence capabilities and intentions were viewed as adversaries. Security provision as a public good is confirmed to be consistently perceived as hierarchic.
The analysis also shows that despite US efforts, some emerging powers eventually rose to be recognised as great power challengers of the US-led world order. They rose through a process of adaptive behaviour, avoiding direct confrontation with the leading power.
This means that early 21st century emerging powers cannot be conceptualised as regional-scale versions of the global power. It also means that world order, which is conceptualised in this paper, and in the NSS documents, as global, is neither inherently anarchic, nor hierarchic. It is shaped by the distribution of capabilities, and by principles imposed by the leading power(s), which prompt adaptive behaviour: they are followed by states that accept the order and integrate into it, while evasive strategies will be pursued by those who are dissatisfied with it. In either case the states are not autonomous, nor are they on an equal footing. Anarchy and hierarchy are confirmed to be the two extremes of the same continuum: they are a matter of degree, and are subject to change, applying unevenly through time and space.
Overall, the contradictions of theory and the empirical findings presented show that the study of sub-systems necessitate an empirically verified global context, and vice versa. The nature of the global system cannot be modelled with sufficient accuracy without examining the system from within.
References
Allison, G. (2017): Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Scribe.
Beetham, D. (2013): The Legitimation of Power .Palgrave Macmillan.
Buzan, B. (1991): New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century. International Affairs 67(3): 431–451.
Buzan, B. – Waever, O. (2003): Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security. Cambridge University Press.
Fernandes, C. (2022): Subimperial Power: Australia in the International Arena. Melbourne University Press.
Flemes, D. – Nolte, D. (2010): Introduction. In: D. Flemes (Ed): Leadership in the Global System: Ideas, Interests and Strategies of Regional Powers. Routledge.
Flint, C. (2017): Introduction to Geopolitics. Routledge.
Flint, C. – Taylor, P. (2018): Political Geography: World-Economy, Nation-State and Locality. Routledge.
Fukuyama, F. (1989): The End of History? The National Interest 16: 3–18.
Garzon, J. F. (2022): The Regional Powers’ Research Programme in International Relations: A Critical Assessment. International Politics :1–23.
Gedeon, P. (2013): Közjó és demokrácia. Két közgazdaságtani elmélet a demokráciáról [Common Good and Democracy. Two Economic Theories of Democracy]. Közgazdasági Szemle 60(12): 1318–1332.
Gilpin, R. (1981): War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge University Press.
Glazebrook, G. D. (1947): The Middle Powers in the United Nations System. International Organization 1(2): 307–318.
Grunberg, I. (1990): Exploring the Myth of “Hegemonic Stability”. International Organization 44(4): 431–477.
Holbraad, C. (1971): The Role of Middle Powers. Cooperation and Conflict 6(1): 77–90.
Huntington, S. (1993): The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs 72(3): 22–49.
Kaul, I. – Grunberg, I. – Stern, M. (1999): Global Public Goods .Oxford University Press.
Kelly, R. E. (2007): Security Theory in the “New Regionalism”. International Studies Review 9: 197–229.
Kissinger, H. (1957): A World Restored-Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812–22 .Houghton Mifflin.
Krauthammer. C. (1990): The Unipolar Moment. Foreign Affairs 70(1): 23–33.
Lake, D. A. (2009a): Regional Hierarchy: Authority and Local International Order. Review of International Studies 35: 35–58.
Lake, D. A. (2009b): Hierarchy in International Relations. Cornell University Press.
Lundestad, G. (1986): Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952. Journal of Peace Research 23(3): 263–277.
Milner, H. (1991): The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique. Review of International Studies 17(1): 67–85.
Moravcsik, A. (1997): Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. International Organization 51(4): 513–553.
National Security Council (1990): National Security Strategy of the United States. [NSS 1990]. https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/strategy/nss1990.pdf.
National Security Council (1991): National Security Strategy of the United States. [NSS 1991]. https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/strategy/nss1991.pdf.
National Security Council (1993): National Security Strategy of the United States. [NSS 1993]. https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/strategy/nss1993.pdf.
National Security Council (1994): A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. [NSS 1994]. https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/strategy/nss94.pdf.
National Security Council (1995): A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. [NSS 1995]. https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/strategy/nss%2895%29.pdf.
National Security Council (1996): A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. [NSS 1996]. https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/strategy/nss1996.pdf.
National Security Council (1997): A National Security Strategy For A New Century. [NSS 1997]. https://dml.armywarcollege.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/WHS-National-Security-Strategy-1997.pdf.
National Security Council (1998): A National Security Strategy for a New Century. [NSS 1998]. https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/strategy/nss-9810.pdf.
National Security Council (1999): A National Security Strategy for a New Century. [NSS 1999]. https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/strategy/nss-1299.pdf.
National Security Council. December (2000): A National Security Strategy for a Global Age. [NSS 2001]. https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss2000.pdf.
National Security Council (2000): A National Security Strategy for a Global Age. [NSS 2000]. https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/strategy/nss-0012.pdf.
National Security Council (2002): The National Security Strategy of the United States. [NSS 2002]. https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/strategy/nss02.pdf.
National Security Council (2006): The National Security Strategy of the United States. [NSS 2006]. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/.
National Security Council (2010): National Security Strategy. [NSS 2010]. https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/strategy/national_security_strategy.pdf.
National Security Council (2015): National Security Strategy. [NSS 2015]. https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/strategy/NSS-2015.pdf.
National Security Council (2017): National Security Strategy. [NSS 2017]. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.
National Security Council (2021): Interim National Security Strategic Guidance. Renewing America’s Advantages. [INSSG 2021]. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.
Nel, P. (2010): Redistribution and Recognition: What Emerging Regional Powers Want. Review of International Studies 36: 951–974.
Nolte, D. (2010): How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics. Review of International Studies 36(4): 881–901.
North, D. C. – Thomas, R. P. (1973): The Rise of the Western World – A New Economic History. Cambridge University Press.
Nye Jr., J. S. (2002): The American National Interest and Global Public Goods. International Affairs 78(2): 233–244.
Nye, J.S., Jr. (2017): Will the Liberal Order Survive? The History of an Idea. Foreign Affairs 96(1): 10–16.
Olson, M. (1965): The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Harvard University Press.
Prys, M. (2010): Hegemony, Domination, Detachment: Differences in Regional Powerhood. International Studies Review 12: 479–504.
Sandler, T. (2006): Regional Public Goods and International Organizations. The Review of International Organizations 1: 5–25.
Waltz, K. N. (1979): Theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
Wohlforth, W. (2013): Gilpinian Realism and International Relations. International Relations 5(4): 499–511.
Most regional power researchers list Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa as ‘regional powers’, but others also include some ASEAN countries and Mexico. All exclude powers they refer to as ‘traditional’, such as Australia, Canada or the United Kingdom (Nolte 2010).
In RPR, the term ‘middle power’ stands for ‘traditional middle powers’, including, for instance, Australia, Canada or the United Kingdom (Nolte 2010). Fernandes (2022) refers to these same power as ‘subimperial’, characterizing them as being co-beneficiaries of the world order, which they actively help sustain.
RPR had no consensus on the definition of ‘region’. Nolte (2010) thinks in terms of distinct, pre-determined regions that have borders. Prys (2010: 484) sees regions as open systems. Flemes and Nolte (2010) point out that regions have identity, geographical, economic, and political dimensions.
World order is understood in this article as the collective of all states, whose relations and interactions are defined by the global distribution of capabilities, and any sets of formal or informal principles that guide interactions, including the norms of trade and conflict resolution, all of which are subject to change, at varying pace.
According to Lake, a key unanswered question is ‘what makes a region a Region’ (Lake 2009a: 57).
Security has much broader interpretations, to include economic, social, health, environmental security beyond the military sense. However, RPR used the term ‘security provision’ in the military sense.
In their international public good provision, a similarity can be observed between post-Cold War emerging powers and post-World War II middle powers. In middle power research, which revolves around the in-betweenness of middle powers within the international hierarchy, George Glazebrook (1947: 307) found that middle powers were ‘concerned to see that they should have what they consider a suitable voice in world affairs.’ He defined middle powers as states simultaneously characterized by ‘their opposition to undue great-power control, their growing tendency to act together, and the influence they have individually come to exert’ (Glazebrook 1947: 308). Within RPR, Nel (2010) saw emerging (‘regional’) powers acting as advocates for the Global South, supporting their quest for global visibility and the recognition of their interests. Whether this advocacy role may translate into forms of strategic cooperation other than the creation of regional security complexes, and what global processes this may instigate was not meaningfully pursued by RPR.
The US strategies use the terms ‘world order’ and ‘international system’ and ‘international order’ interchangeably.
