This paper focuses on the theoretical grounds of supermajority, its special relevance in parliamentary systems and the related experiences from Central and Eastern Europe, especially Hungary.
In parliamentary systems, the support of the parliamentary majority is a necessity and sufficient condition for governance – there is no need for supermajoritarian decision-making in issues of daily politics. A qualified majority has a different function and is an internal institutional limit of the legislative power – protecting the minority interests against the unilateral decisions of the majority in the most important issues of the political community.
The Hungarian situation from 2010–2015 demonstrates that minorities cannot influence the decisions where the supermajority represents a one-party opinion. Moreover, decisions of the supermajority can block future modifications of the future parliamentary majority as well. It will be argued in this paper that only a substantive approach to supermajority can support its basic function.
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