Journal of Evolutionary Psychology
Volume/Issue:
Volume 11: Issue 1
Ubiquity and efficiency of restrictions on informal punishment rights
Authors:
Kimmo Eriksson Centre for Study of Cultural Evolution, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
School of Education, Culture and Communication, Mälardalen University, Västerås, Sweden

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Pontus Strimling Centre for Study of Cultural Evolution, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden

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Micael Ehn Centre for Study of Cultural Evolution, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden

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Pages:
17–34
Online Publication Date:
01 Mar 2013
Publication Date:
01 Mar 2013
Article Category:
Research Article
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1556/jep.11.2013.1.3
Restricted access

Abstract

Over-punishment often occurs in anonymous peer-to-peer punishment in public goods game experiments where punishment is free for all. We report a public goods game experiment in which a condition where punishment rights were restricted to one other player per player yielded higher total welfare than a condition with unrestricted punishment. In the restricted punishment condition, there was much less punishment but high levels of cooperation were achieved nonetheless. This indicates that it may be beneficial to groups to restrict punishment rights. In a second study we presented respondents from many different countries with three scenarios constituting everyday social dilemmas of various kinds. Across countries, respondents tended to judge it as inappropriate for most involved parties to punish selfish individuals in the scenarios. Typically, only one party was judged to have the right to punish. Whereas much prior work has considered punishment as a public good that needs to be encouraged, these findings suggest that informal norms about sanctions tend to constrain punishment to certain individuals. Such norms may serve the function to harness the positive effects of punishment while containing the negative effects, and we suggest that they are likely to arise from learning.

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Cover Journal of Evolutionary Psychology
Journal of Evolutionary Psychology
Print ISSN:
1789-2082
Online ISSN:
2060-5587

Journal of Evolutionary Psychology 
Language English
Size  
Year of
Foundation		 2007 (2003)
Publication
Programme		 changed title
Volumes
per Year		  
Issues
per Year		  
Founder Akadémiai Kiadó
Founder's
Address		 H-1117 Budapest, Hungary 1516 Budapest, PO Box 245.
Publisher Akadémiai Kiadó
Publisher's
Address		 H-1117 Budapest, Hungary 1516 Budapest, PO Box 245.
Responsible
Publisher		 Chief Executive Officer, Akadémiai Kiadó
ISSN 1789-2082 (Print)
ISSN 2060-5587 (Online)

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